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TriggerFish, StingRays, and Fourth 
Amendment Fishing Expeditions 
Brian L. Owsley* 
Cell site simulators are an electronic surveillance device that mimics a cell tower 
causing all nearby cell phones to register their data and information with the cell site 
simulator. Law enforcement increasingly relies on these devices during the course of 
routine criminal investigations.  
 
The use of cell site simulators raises several concerns. First, the federal government 
seeks judicial authorization to use such devices via a pen register application. This 
approach is problematic because a cell site simulator is different than a pen register. 
Moreover, the standard for issuance of a pen register is very low. Instead, this Article 
proposes that the applicable standard for granting a request to use a cell site simulator 
should be based on the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard.  
 
Second, cell site simulators sweep up the data and information of innocent third-parties. 
The government fails to account for this problem. This Article proposes that the 
granting of an application for a cell site simulator should require a protocol for dealing 
with the third-party information that is captured.  
 
 * Brian L. Owsley, Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana Tech Law School; B.A., 1988, 
University of Notre Dame; J.D., 1993, Columbia University School of Law; M.I.A., 1994, Columbia 
University School of International and Public Affairs. From 2005 until 2013, the Author served as a 
United States Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. I am 
very grateful for valuable comments and critiques provided by Steven Friedland, Jonah Horwitz, 
Stephen Wm. Smith, and Christopher Soghoian. 
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Introduction 
In recent years, traditional and online media have raised concerns 
about a means of electronic surveillance employed by the government 
that has various colorful and ominous names: TriggerFish, StingRay, 
AmberJack, KingFish, LoggerHead, Gossamer, Harpoon, Hailstorm, 
International Mobile Subscriber Identifier (“IMSI”)1 catcher, Electronic 
Serial Number (“ESN”)2 reader, cell site simulator, or digital analyzer.3 
The first eight names are essentially brand names of similar devices 
manufactured and sold by the Harris Corporation.4 In the course of 
various criminal investigations, the government seeks to utilize an 
electronic device known as a StingRay that acts as a cell site simulator.5 
In other words, the device deceives nearby cell phones into believing that 
the device is a cell tower so that the cell phone’s information is then 
downloaded into the cell site simulator.6 
Imagine if you will, a federal agent sitting inside an unmarked van in 
a parking lot monitoring the activities of some subject of a criminal 
investigation. Inside the van the agent has an electronic surveillance 
device about the size of a bankers box connected to a laptop computer. 
With this device, the agent is targeting the subject’s cell phone in a 
manner that the cell phone’s number and other data, including, 
 
 1. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 964 F. Supp. 
2d 674, 675 (S.D. Tex. 2013).  
 2. See id. 
 3. See generally Marc Rotenberg & David Brody, Protecting Privacy: The Role of the Courts 
and Congress, 39 Hum. Rts. 7 (2013); Jon Campbell, LAPD Spied on 21 Using StingRay Anti-
Terrorism Tool, L.A. Weekly (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.laweekly.com/2013-01-24/news/stingray-
LAPD-spying-21-terrorism-tool-against-citizens; Ryan Gallagher, FBI Files Unlock History Behind 
Clandestine Cellphone Tracking Tool, Slate (Feb. 15, 2013, 2:34 PM), 
www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/ 
02/15/stingray_imsi_catcher_fbi_files_unlock_history_behind_cellphone_tracking.html; John Kelly, It’s 
Not Just the NSA: An Increasing Number of Police Agencies Across the USA Are Snatching Your 
Cellphone Data, Whether You’re a Suspect or Not, USA Today, Dec. 9, 2013, at A1; Leslie Meredith, 
Law Enforcement Tracks Phones With Phony Cell Towers, Tech News Daily (July 12, 2012), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140531131028/http://www.technewsdaily.com/4537-embargoed-law-
enforcement-tracks-real-phones-phony-cell-towers.html; Ellen Nakashima, Little-Known Surveillance 
Tool Raises Questions Over Privacy, Wash. Post, Mar. 28, 2013, at A3; Jennifer Valentino-Devries, 
‘Stingray’ Phone Tracker Fuels Constitutional Clash, Wall St. J. (Sept. 22, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904194604576583112723197574.html; see also 
Daehyun Strobel, IMSI Catcher 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.emsec.rub.de/media/crypto/attachments/ 
files/2011/04/imsi_catcher.pdf (“The IMSI Catcher is an expensive device to identify, track and tap a 
mobile phone user in such a way, that even the network operator cannot notice anything.”). 
 4. Harris Wireless Prods. Grp., Harris GCSD Price List, available at 
https://info.publicintelligence.net/Harris-SurveillancePriceList.pdf; Ryan Gallagher, Meet the 
Machines That Steal Your Phone’s Data, Ars Technica (Sept. 25, 2013, 10:00 AM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/09/meet-the-machines-that-steal-your-phones-data/. 
 5. See Nakashima, supra note 3; Campbell, supra note 3; Valentino-Devries, supra note 3. 
 6. See Strobel, supra note 3, at 13–15. 
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potentially, voice communications, can be downloaded. This is a great 
device for apprehending the bad guys. Unfortunately, this device is 
capturing similar information from all the cell phones in the surrounding 
area. So the person who lives nearby, the couple who are sitting in the 
coffee shop on the corner, and you as you drive by in your car—all of you 
are also having your cell phone information captured and downloaded 
into the agent’s computer. Let us assume that the agent obtained some 
kind of judicial authorization for this electronic surveillance. Would you 
want your information captured and saved in a government computer 
forever based only on the most minimal of standards? That is what the 
federal government is doing through its current use of cell site simulators. 
Whatever these devices are called, they have proliferated in recent 
years, being used by state and federal law enforcement officials as well as 
by American and foreign intelligence agencies.7 Not only are large law 
enforcement agencies like the Los Angeles Police Department using 
them,8 but small cities like Gilbert, Arizona have also acquired them.9 
This technology, which has been patented since at least 2002,10 has often 
been purchased with funds from the Department of Homeland Security 
to assist in regional terrorism investigations.11 However, these devices 
have also come to be used for routine criminal investigations, including 
such offenses as burglary and murder.12 
This Article addresses the use of cell site simulators and makes 
three principal points. First, the government’s current approach of 
relying on the pen register statute to justify its requests for court orders 
fails because cell site simulators are not pen registers and thus are not 
 
 7. Kelly, supra note 3. 
 8. Campbell, supra note 3; see Cyrus Farivar, Local Cops in 15 U.S. States Confirmed to Use 
Cell Tracking Devices, Ars Technica (June 12, 2014, 12:32 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2014/06/local-cops-in-15-us-states-confirmed-to-use-cell-tracking-devices. 
 9. In response to a request for information on electronic surveillance, Gilbert police officials 
informed the ACLU about their cell site simulator purchase: “The Gilbert Police Department 
obtained a $150,000 grant from the State Homeland Security Program. These funds, along with 
$94,195 of R.I.C.O. monies, were used to purchase cell phone tracking equipment in June 2008 (total 
acquisition cost of [$] 244,195).” Letter from Kate Weiby, Gilbert Police Legal Advisor, & Tim Dorn, 
Gilbert Chief of Police, to Dan Pochoda, ACLU (Sept. 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/town_of_gilberts_response_to_prr_re_cell_phone_location_records.pdf; 
accord Bob Sullivan, Pricey ‘Stingray’ Gadget Lets Cops Track Cellphones Without Telco Help, NBC 
News (Apr. 3, 2012, 2:47 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/pricey-stingray-gadget-
lets-cops-track-cellphones-without-telco-help-f635294. Based on the 2010 U.S. Census, Gilbert had an 
estimated population of 221,140 in 2012. Gilbert Quick Facts, U.S. Census Bureau, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/04/0427400.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). 
 10. Allie Bohm, You’re Getting Warmer . . ., ACLU Blog of Rts. (Sept. 26, 2011, 2:12 PM), 
http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/youre-getting-warmer; see MMI Research Ltd. v. 
Cellxion Ltd., [2012] EWCA (Civ) 7 (Eng.).  
 11. Campbell, supra note 3; Joel Kurth & Lauren Abdel-Razzaq, Oakland Deputies Use Cellphone 
Tracker—Military Device Sweeps All Calls Made in Wide Area, Detroit News, Apr. 4, 2014, at A6. 
 12. Kurth & Abdel-Razzaq, supra note 11. 
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covered by the pen register statute. Second, the use of cell site simulators 
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, which requires probable cause. 
Consequently, the proper approach is for the government to establish 
probable cause in order to obtain a search warrant consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment. Third, the use of the cell site simulators raises 
privacy concerns for third parties. 
This Article raises the issue of cell site simulators in two ways that 
have not been addressed in current scholarship. First, I provide examples 
of court orders that address the use of these devices that have not been 
probed in previous legal scholarship. Second, I analyze the statutory and 
constitutional framework in which the government seeks to use cell site 
simulators. This Article provides a brief description of cellular telephone 
and cell site technology that concerns devices such as cell site simulators 
in Part I. Next, Part II provides a detailed description of how these types 
of devices operate. In Part III, the discussion documents the historical 
development of pen registers, including their statutory history. Part IV 
provides the various few examples of the government’s applications for 
cell site simulators, as well as orders addressing such applications. Part V 
analyzes the development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and 
discusses the use of cell site simulators in light of people’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy. In assessing these expectations, courts have, to a 
certain extent, relied on decisions that shape the third party doctrine—
Smith v. Maryland13 and United States v. Miller14—that no longer 
adequately address the realities of today’s cell phone technology or 
people’s expectations of privacy. Finally, in Part VI, I conclude by 
making some proposals as to how to address the privacy concerns. 
I.  Cell Site Simulators Utilize Basic Existing Cellular 
Telephone Technology 
To fully appreciate the significance of a cell site simulator, it is 
important to understand the basics of how cellular telephones work. In 
enacting the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), 
Congress addressed cellular telephones, which at that time were based 
on radio transmission.15 In building a network, telecommunications 
 
 13. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 14. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 15. See Timothy B. Lee, Documents Show Cops Making Up the Rules on Mobile Surveillance, 
Ars Technica (Apr. 3, 2012, 7:40 AM) http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/04/documents-show-
cops-making-up-the-rules-on-mobile-surveillance; see also In re Application of the U.S. for Historical 
Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (“[C]ellular telephones use radio waves to 
communicate between the user’s handset and the telephone network.”); In re Application for Pen 
Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750 (S.D. Tex. 2005) 
(“A cell phone is a sophisticated two-way radio with a low-power transmitter that operates in a 
network of cell sites.”); Brian Owsley, The Fourth Amendment Implications of the Government’s Use 
of Cell Tower Dumps in its Electronic Surveillance, 16 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1, 3 (2013). 
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providers created “large service areas [that] are divided into honeycomb-
shaped segments or ‘cells’—each of which is equipped with a low-power 
transmitter or base station which can receive and radiate messages within 
its parameters” from cellular phones within the providers’ networks.16 
Each “cell,” in turn, collects “a number of pieces of data ‘regarding the 
strength, angle, and timing of the caller’s signal measured at two or more 
cell sites, as well as other system information such as a listing of all cell 
towers in the market area, switching technology, protocols, and network 
architecture.’”17 Consequently, each cell site “detects the radio signal 
from the handset, and connects it to the local telephone network, the 
Internet, or another wireless network.”18 Typically, cell sites are 
physically located atop towers, but the equipment can also be placed on 
trees, roofs, flagpoles, and buildings.19 
Within this framework of cell tower networks, the origination of a 
cellular telephone call initiates a series of relays along the cell site 
network: 
When a caller dials a number on a cellular telephone, a transceiver 
sends signals over the air on a radio frequency to a cell site. From there 
the signal travels over phone lines or a microwave to a computerized 
mobile telephone switching office (“MTSO”) or station. The MTSO 
automatically and inaudibly switches the conversation from one base 
station and one frequency to another as the portable 
telephone . . . moves from cell to cell.20 
Whenever any cellular phone is turned on, it sends out a signal seeking 
the closest cell site, which in turn will register that telephone with that 
 
 16. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 9 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3563; see In re 
Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device, 396 F. Supp. 2d 750 (“‘Cell’ refers to geographic 
regions often illustrated as hexagons, resembling a bee’s honeycomb; a ‘cell site’ is where the radio 
transceiver and base station controller are located (at the point three hexagons meet).”); Aaron Blank, 
The Limitations and Admissibility of Using Historical Cellular Site Data to Track the Location of a 
Cellular Phone, 18 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 3, 4 (2011) (discussing the honeycomb pattern creating cells); 
Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward Reasonable Standards for 
Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress Could Enact, 27 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 117, 
126 (2012) (“Service providers maintain large numbers of radio base stations (also called ‘cell sites’) 
spread through their geographic coverage areas. These cell sites are generally located on ‘cell towers’ 
serving geographic areas of varying sizes, depending upon topography and population 
concentration.”). 
 17. Ian Herbert, Where We Are with Location Tracking: A Look at the Current Technology and 
the Implications on Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 442, 478 (2012) 
(quoting In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 749); see Owsley, 
supra note 15, at 3–4. 
 18. In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 831 (citations 
omitted).  
 19. Id.; see Owsley, supra note 15, at 4. 
 20. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 9; see Pell & Soghoian, supra note 16, at 127 (“mobile telephones (as their 
name suggests) are portable, and so when a phone moves away from the cell site with which it started a 
call and nearer to a different cell site, the call is ‘handed over’ from one cell site to another without 
interruption”); Owsley, supra note 15, at 4. 
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cell site.21 “This process, called ‘registration,’ occurs approximately every 
seven seconds,”22 enabling “cellular providers to obtain a plethora of 
information about the telephones contacting their cell-sites.”23 
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has explained that “to provide 
service to cellular telephones, providers have the technical capability to 
collect information such as the cell tower nearest to a particular cell 
phone, the portion of that tower facing the phone, and often the signal 
strength of the phone.”24 For example, in 1997, the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) issued rules “requir[ing] cellular 
service providers to upgrade their systems to identify more precisely the 
longitude and latitude of mobile units making emergency 911 calls.”25 
Telecommunications providers “generally keep detailed historical 
records of this information for billing and other business purposes.”26 
This network of cell towers was designed to further communication 
among a subscriber’s cell phone with other cell phones or landline 
telephones. It is necessary for efficient operation of the network. It is 
unlikely to change in any significant manner because the complete 
 
 21. ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 13–14 (2010) (statement of Matt Blaze, Associate Professor, University of 
Pennsylvania); Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, A Lot More than a Pen Register, and Less 
than a Wiretap, 16 Yale J. L. & Tech. 134, 144 (2014); Blank, supra note 16, at 5; see Owsley, supra note 
15, at 5. 
 22. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to 
Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 590 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (citation omitted), rev’d on 
other grounds, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010); accord Owsley, supra note 15, at 5; Kevin McLaughlin, 
Note, The Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Location Tracking: Where Are We?, 29 Hastings 
Comm. & Ent. L.J. 421, 426 (2007). 
 23. Owsley, supra note 15, at 5. 
 24. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Electronic Surveillance Manual 41 (rev. 2005) [hereinafter 
Electronic Surveillance Manual], available at www.justice.gov/criminal/foia/docs/elec-sur-
manual.pdf; see In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-
Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Cell phones work by communicating with cell-
sites operated by cell-phone service providers. Each cell-site operates at a certain location and covers a 
certain range of distance.”). 
 25. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified 
Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 532 (D. Md. 2011); see Laurie Thomas Lee, Can Police Track Your 
Wireless? Call Location Information and Privacy Law, 21 Cardozo Arts. & Ent. L.J. 381, 384–86 
(2003) (discussing the FCC’s enhanced 9-1-1 regulations); 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h) (2013) (setting accuracy 
standards for cell phone calls within targeted distances). 
 26. Electronic Surveillance Manual, supra note 24, at 41; In re Application of the U.S. for & 
Order: (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device; (2) Authorizing Release of 
Subscriber & Other Info.; & (3) Authorizing the Disclosure of Location-Based Servs., 727 F. Supp. 2d 
571, 573 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (cell site location information “is information that resides on computer servers 
of telecommunications providers”); see In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of 
a Cellular Tel. Digital Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. 197, 199 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (“The telephone company uses 
this information both to bill the subscriber of the cellular telephone based on its usage and also to connect 
the cellular telephone to the telephone number called.”); Pell & Soghoian, supra note 16, at 128 
(“Wireless service providers retain detailed logs for diagnostic, billing, and other purposes.”). 
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overhaul of the technology would be expensive. It is this system of cell 
tower networks that government officials seek to utilize when employing 
cell site simulators. 
Most cellular telephones around the world operate through the 
Global System for Mobile Communications (“GSM”).27 Within this 
system, a cell phone initiating a call connects through its unique 
International Module Equipment Identity (“IMEI”)28 to a base station, 
which is essentially the hardware of a cell tower.29 A base station 
potentially can operate with signal strength as low as fifty watts.30 Of 
course, the number of base stations in an area hinges on the volume of 
demand for cellular service in that area: 
The size of the cell depends basically on the geographic features of the 
area and consequently on the range of the stations. But also the 
number of possible calls, that have to be handled simultaneously, has 
to be considered, since it is limited by the number of available 
channels. Hence, in densely populated areas, the cells often have a 
diameter of only a few hundred meters, whereas in sparsely populated 
areas several kilometers are usual.31 
A base station is “not only responsible for the connectivity [of the cell 
phone call, but is] also needed for encryption and decryption of 
communication data.”32 From the base station, a cell phone call is routed 
to a base station controller, which in turn will move the call to another 
base station to prevent the call from being terminated.33 If this handoff 
has to be done beyond a base station controller’s range, then the transfer 
is handled by a mobile switching center.34 This transfer represents the 
final stage of the call as the mobile switching center “is responsible for 
the authentication, routing, handoffs over different Base Station 
Controllers, connection to the landline, etc.”35 
 
 27. Strobel, supra note 3, at 3 (“GSM is the most common standard for communication. It is 
used in more than 200 countries and territories all over the world.”); Karsten Nohl & Chris Paget, 
GSM—SRSLY?, Chaos Commc’n Cong. 2 (Dec. 27, 2009), http://events.ccc.de/congress/2009/ 
Fahrplan/attachments/1519_26C3.Karsten.Nohl.GSM.pdf (noting that GSM is used by eighty percent 
of the cell phone market, with over four billion users). 
 28. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 964 F. Supp. 2d 
674, 675 (S.D. Tex. 2013); see Analysis of IMEI Numbers, Int’l Numbering Plans, 
https://www.numberingplans.com/?page=analysis&sub=imeinr (last visited Dec. 14, 2014) (“All mobile 
phones are assigned a unique 15 digit IMEI code upon production.”). 
 29. See Strobel, supra note 3, at 4; see also GSM—The Base Station Subsystem (BSS), 
Tutorialspoint, http://www.tutorialspoint.com/gsm/gsm_base_station_subsystem.htm (last visited 
Dec. 14, 2014). 
 30. Strobel, supra note 3, at 13; David Talbot, A 50-Watt Cellular Network, MIT Tech. Rev. 
(Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/417442/a-50-watt-cellular-network. 
 31. Strobel, supra note 3, at 4. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 4–5; see Blank, supra note 16, at 5–6 (discussing the handoff process). 
 34. Strobel, supra note 3, at 5. 
 35. Id. 
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II.  Cell Site Simulators Capitalize on Existing Cellular 
Technology to Retrieve a Cell Phone User’s Information 
Understanding how cell phone technology works, it is next 
important to appreciate how cell site simulators exploit cell phone 
technology in order to gather electronic information. 
A. Basic Operations of Cell Site Simulators 
Cell site simulators are being used more and more by intelligence 
agencies around the world, not just in the United States.36 Although the 
Harris Corporation is one of the major producers of these devices, these 
days, a reasonably bright computer whiz with $1,500 can buy the raw 
components to make one.37 The names TriggerFish and StingRay are 
trade names manufactured by the Harris Corporation, which sells those 
devices to American law enforcement and intelligence agencies.38 
Essentially, a TriggerFish is an older piece of technology that is a digital 
analyzer for passive interception of analog cell phone service.39 In other 
words, while it can intercept a cell phone call’s verbal content, a digital 
analyzer (because it is a passive surveillance technique) can intercept 
only cell phones that are actually transmitting. 
On the other hand, a StingRay is an IMSI catcher that captures 
digital cell phone information through an active interception process.40 In 
1996, Rohde & Schwarz, a German electronics company specializing in 
wireless communications, first invented an IMSI catcher that was able 
“to identify a subscriber by forcing it to transmit the IMSI.”41 One year 
later, the next model created by Rohde & Schwarz enabled the user “not 
 
 36. See Ryan Gallagher, Criminals May Be Using Covert Mobile Phone Surveillance Tech for 
Extortion, Slate (Aug. 22, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/08/22/ 
imsi_catchers_criminals_law_enforcement_using_high_tech_portable_devices_to_intercept_communic
ations_.html. 
 37. Chris Soghoian, Cellular Phones and Mobile Privacy: Direct Government Surveillance 
(Stingrays), Location Tracking and Biometrics Conference at Yale Law School (Mar. 3, 2013), 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OwutGSjNQ0k.  
 38. Declan McCullagh, FBI Prepares to Defend ‘Stingray’ Cell Phone Tracking, CNET (Mar. 27, 
2013, 4:57 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57576690-38/fbi-prepares-to-defend-stingray-cell-
phone-tracking; Valentino-Devries, supra note 3. Interestingly, while the Harris Corporation notes a 
number of the products and services it provides to customers on its websites, it does not address this 
electronic surveillance technology. Harris, http://www.harris.com (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). 
 39. Location Tracking and Biometrics Conference, supra note 37; see Gallagher, supra note 4; see 
also In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. 
Supp. 2d 747, 755 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (defining a TriggerFish as a device that “enables law enforcement 
to gather cell site data directly, without the assistance of the service provider”). 
 40. Location Tracking and Biometrics Conference, supra note 37; Nohl & Paget, supra note 27. 
 41. Strobel, supra note 3, at 13; see MMI Research Ltd. v. Cellxion Ltd., [2012] EWCA (Civ) 7, 
[4] (Eng.) (“These are devices used by the police and security services to discover the mobile phone 
numbers of suspected criminals or terrorists. Every mobile phone has an ‘IMSI’ associated with its 
SIM card, which is its permanent identity number.”). 
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only to identify, but also to tap outgoing calls.”42 Thus, as early as 1997, 
an IMSI catcher could be used to capture audio content. 
Within the GSM, there is a vulnerability in the authentication 
process that enables cell site simulators, like an IMSI catcher, to breach 
the system.43 Specifically, “it is not necessary to authenticate a Base 
Station to a Mobile Station.”44 In other words, the cell site simulator 
tricks the nearby cell phone into transmitting information to it as it 
would the nearest cell tower. “An IMSI catcher exploits this weakness 
and masquerades to a Mobile Station as a Base Station.”45 Through this 
masquerade, the cell site simulator “causes every mobile phone of the 
simulated network operator within a defined radius to log in” or register 
with it as it would a cell tower.46 
Cell phones are designed to optimize reception by seeking the 
strongest signal among nearby base stations.47 A base station can operate 
effectively with signal strength as low as twenty-five watts.48 Thus, for a 
cell site simulator to be effective, it need only be marginally stronger 
than the signal of the nearest cell towers. 
B. The Manner in Which Law Enforcement Officials Use Cell Site 
Simulators 
Law enforcement officials will often use a cell site simulator inside a 
vehicle in conjunction with a computer that has mapping software.49 
Normally when a cellular phone is turned on, it seeks a connection to its 
telecommunications network system by using the nearest cell tower 
within its network.50 This registration process enables the cell phone to 
communicate with its network, transmitting information and data, 
including audio content. Capitalizing on this registration, after the cell 
 
 42. Strobel, supra note 3, at 13; see Integrated Ratio Communication Network—Rohde & 
Schwarz, Tiara Commc’ns, https://web.archive.org/web/20090209050710/http://tiaracom.com.my/ 
rohde&schwarz.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2014) (informational sheet from Rohde & Schwarz regarding 
its IMSI catcher’s capacities). 
 43. Strobel, supra note 3, at 7. 
 44. Id. at 13. 
 45. Id.; Pell & Soghoian, supra note 21, at 145–46; see MMI Research, [2012] EWCA (Civ) 7, [5] 
(Noting the IMSI catcher created by Rohde & Schwarz “involves the creation of a false base station. Mobile 
phones in a particular area will transmit information to a base station which operates as a transmitter and a 
receiver to and from the phones. The IMSI catcher uses a false base station which is constructed in a manner 
which leads the phone to believe it is genuine, and thereby to communicate with it.”). 
 46. Strobel, supra note 3, at 13; Kelly, supra note 3; Pell & Soghoian, supra note 21, at 147–48. 
 47. Strobel, supra note 3, at 13; Blank, supra note 16, at 5 (“When a user places a call, the cell 
phone connects to the cell site with the strongest signal.”). 
 48. Strobel, supra note 3, at 13. 
 49. Kelly, supra note 3; Jennifer Valentino-Devries, How ‘Stingray’ Devices Work, Wall St. J. 
(Sept. 21, 2011, 10:33 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/09/21/how-stingray-devices-work. 
 50. Kelly, supra note 3; Jon Campbell, LAPD Spy Device Taps Your Cell Phone, L.A. Weekly 
(Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.laweekly.com/2012-09-13/news/LAPD-stingray-spying-cellphone. 
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site simulator mimics a cell tower, nearby cellular phones will connect to 
it. This connection enables the device to download telephone numbers 
and other information related to the cellular phones, such as signal 
strength, because it typically emits the strongest signal in the nearby 
area.51 For example, this technology would enable the user of a cell site 
simulator to detect the electronic serial number of the phone, the 
number for the cellular telephone, as well as any telephone numbers 
called from the cell phone.52 The surveillance vehicle can then move to 
several different locations, collecting the phone’s signal strength, thus 
enabling the officers to triangulate and map the phone’s location.53 
In addition to downloading information from all the cellular phones 
located within the area, a cell site simulator can be used to locate a 
specific cellular phone when the number is already known, but the 
location is unknown.54 Law enforcement officials “can drive around until 
they get a signal from the target phone while pinging it.”55 After the 
target phone is located, the signal strength is measured in order to 
triangulate and map the location again.56 In a hearing addressing 
electronic surveillance issues, an FBI agent “testified that he was able to 
determine the approximate distance from the originating cell tower 
where the cell phone and Stingray switched from the originating cell 
tower to another cell tower.”57 He further explained “that this method 
allows him to determine, with a reasonable degree of certainty, a fairly 
narrow geographical location where an individual is located while a cell 
call is being placed.”58 
Similarly, in a warrantless search by the Tallahassee Police 
Department, officers used a handheld device, as well as one mounted on 
 
 51. Valentino-Devries, supra note 49; Campbell, supra note 50. 
 52. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Cellular Tel. Digital 
Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. 197, 199 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
 53. Valentino-Devries, supra note 49; see Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the 
Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 Md. L. Rev. 681, 712–13 (2011) (discussing 
triangulation). 
 54. Valentino-Devries, supra note 49. 
 55. Id. Pinging is the system by which a cell phone sends out data to register with the nearest cell 
phone towers. Id. See United States v. Allums, No. 2:08-CR-30 TS, 2009 WL 806748, at *3 (D. Utah 
Mar. 24, 2009) (discussing an agent driving around with the device); United States v. Rigmaiden 
(Rigmaiden I), 844 F. Supp. 2d 982, 995 (D. Ariz. 2012) (“The FBI used the device in multiple 
locations. The FBI analyzed signals exchanged between the mobile tracking device and the aircard. 
The FBI would take a reading, move to another location, take another reading, move to another 
location, etc.”); United States v. Rigmaiden (Rigmaiden II), No. CR 08-814-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 
1932800, at *15 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013) (same). 
 56. Valentino-Devries, supra note 49. 
 57. Allums, 2009 WL 806748, at *1; see Blank, supra note 16, at 30–31 (discussing the 
admissibility of expert testimony by the FBI agent). 
 58. Allums, 2009 WL 806748, at *1. 
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a police vehicle.59 Testimony from an unsealed hearing transcript 
revealed how the cell site simulators were employed: 
Police drove through the area using the vehicle-based device until they 
found the apartment complex in which the target phone was located, 
and then they walked around with the handheld device and stood ‘at 
every door and every window in that complex’ until they figured out 
which apartment the phone was located in. In other words, police were 
lurking outside people’s windows and sending powerful electronic 
signals into their private homes in order to collect information from 
within.60 
Consistent with the testimony in United States v. Allums, it is apparent 
that some law enforcement officials are personally using this technology, 
as opposed to relying on any third-party telecommunications providers. 
Any signals sent by law enforcement officials using a cell site 
simulator are signals that would not otherwise have been sent during the 
normal operations of a telecommunication provider’s operation of its cell 
towers.61 Moreover, the use of this device causes a brief disruption in the 
telecommunication provider’s service to the cell phone.62 
Some law enforcement officials are utilizing cell site simulators 
without court authorization.63 Moreover, the federal officials who do 
seek a court order routinely file such applications pursuant to the pen 
register statute.64 This approach is highly advantageous for the 
government, as the standard for a pen register application is much lower 
than the standard for a warrant because it does not require probable 
cause.65 
III.  The Development of the Pen Register Statute 
In order to analyze the inapplicability of the pen register statute to 
cell site simulators, one must know the function of a pen register. When 
the government seeks to ascertain the telephone numbers of incoming 
 
 59. See Thomas v. State, 127 So. 3d 658, 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Nathan Freed Wessler, 
Victory: Judge Releases Information About Police Use of Stingray Cell Phone Trackers, ACLU 
(June 3, 2014, 3:12 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/victory-
judge-releases-information-about-police-use. 
 60. See Wessler, supra note 59. 
 61. Rigmaiden I, 844 F. Supp. 2d 982, 995 (D. Ariz. 2012); Rigmaiden II, No. CR 08-814-PHX-
DGC, 2013 WL 1932800, at *15 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013). 
 62. Rigmaiden I, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 995; Rigmaiden II, 2013 WL 1932800, at *15. 
 63. See Wessler, supra note 59 (noting that Tallahassee police were using a StingRay without a 
warrant). 
 64. 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (2012). 
 65. Compare id. § 3123(a)(1) (a pen register order is issued “if the court finds that the attorney 
for the Government has certified to the court that the information likely to be obtained by such 
installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation”), with Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d)(1) 
(“After receiving an affidavit or other information, a magistrate judge—or if authorized by Rule 41(b), 
a judge of a state court of record—must issue the warrant if there is probable cause to search for and 
seize a person or property or to install and use a tracking device.”). 
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and outgoing calls, it files an application seeking a court order 
authorizing a pen register and a trap and trace device, respectively.66 
Historically, the Supreme Court defined a pen register as a device 
recording the outgoing numbers dialed from a specific telephone.67 In 
United States v. New York Telephone Company,68 the Court similarly 
defined a pen register: “A pen register is a mechanical device that 
records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical 
impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released. It does not 
overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls are 
actually completed.”69 In other words, the Court reiterated the position 
from United States v. Giordano, that a pen register concerns the 
telephone numbers of outgoing calls from a specific telephone. 
In New York Telephone, the Supreme Court held that Title III of 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Wiretap 
Act”) did not apply to pen registers.70 Instead, the Court held that the 
statute concerned only “orders ‘authorizing or approving the 
interception of a wire or oral communication.’”71 Because pen registers 
do not intercept any communications, the Wiretap Act did not authorize 
pen registers. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that district courts have 
the authority to authorize the installation of a pen register.72 The basis 
for this authority was Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which requires a showing of probable cause.73 Specifically, 
the Court reasoned “that Rule 41 is sufficiently broad to include seizures 
of intangible items such as dial impulses recorded by pen registers.”74 
 
 66. See generally Electronic Surveillance Manual, supra note 24, at 38–40. 
 67. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 511 n.2 (1974) (noting that a pen register is “a 
device that records telephone numbers dialed from a particular phone”) (emphasis added); see also id. 
at 549 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A pen register is a mechanical device 
attached to a given telephone line and usually installed at a central telephone facility. It records on a 
paper tape all numbers dialed from that line. It does not identify the telephone numbers from which 
incoming calls originated, nor does it reveal whether any call, either incoming or outgoing, was 
completed. Its use does not involve any monitoring of telephone conversations.”). 
 68. 434 U.S. 159 (1977). 
 69. Id. at 161 n.1; see 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2012). 
 70. 434 U.S. at 166; see David McPhie, Almost Private: Pen Registers, Packet Sniffers, and 
Privacy at the Margin, 2005 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 1, 8 (“Almost ten years after Title III had been signed 
into law, the Supreme Court in United States v. New York Telephone Company relied on th[e] 
legislative history and the statutory language in holding that pen registers did not intercept the 
‘contents’ of communications, and so did not fall within the scope of Title III.”). 
 71. N.Y. Tel., 434 U.S. at 166 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (1976)) (emphasis in original). 
 72. Id. at 168. 
 73. Id. at 168–69; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d) (“After receiving an affidavit or other information, a 
magistrate judge . . . must issue the warrant if there is probable cause to search for and seize a person 
or property or to install and use a tracking device.”).  
 74. N.Y. Tel., 434 U.S. at 170. 
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In 1986, Congress enacted the ECPA, which amended the Wiretap 
Act to explicitly address pen registers.75 The ECPA defined a pen 
register as a “device which records or decodes electronic or other 
impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise 
transmitted . . . on the telephone line to which such device is attached.”76 
This definition essentially follows the definition enunciated in New York 
Telephone. 
In the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 
1994, Congress mandated that both telecommunications and Internet 
service providers permit authorized law enforcement officers access to 
their networks in order for them to engage in electronic surveillance.77 
Regarding pen registers, however, the statute required that use of such 
technology “shall not include any information that may disclose the 
physical location of the subscriber.”78 Through this revision, Congress 
sought to capture transmitted e-mail data as well as the outgoing number 
dialed on cell phones, but not the location of the cell phone itself. In 
testifying before Congress in support of the statute, then-FBI Director 
Louis Freeh attempted to assuage legislators’ concerns the statute would 
be used to authorize the tracking of individuals.79 
In 2001, Congress amended the definition of the term “pen register” 
in the USA Patriot Act.80 The Patriot Act defines a “pen register” as “a 
device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, 
 
 75. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 9 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557 (“Title III of the 
bill addresses pen registers.”). 
 76. Electronics Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing 
the Use of a Cellular Tel. Digital Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. 197, 200 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (addressing the 
statutory definition); accord United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 512 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 
18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) and explaining this pen register definition applied when the surveillance occurred, 
between May and July 2001); Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 373 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002); Brown v. 
Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 290 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)); see U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 
227 F.3d 450, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Pen registers record telephone numbers of outgoing calls.”). 
 77. See generally Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 
108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); see also Timothy Casey, 
Electronic Surveillance and the Right to Be Secure, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 977, 1003 (2008). 
 78. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (2011). 
 79. See Police Access to Advanced Communication Systems: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Tech. & the Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. S., and the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional 
Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R., 103d Cong. (1994) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, 
FBI), available at 1994 WL 223962; see also In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the 
Installation & Use of a Pen Register, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211, 216–17 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (discussing 
Director Freeh’s testimony); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of 
Prospective Cell Site Info., 412 F. Supp. 2d 947, 955 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (same). 
 80. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8, 12, 15, 18, 20, 31, 42, 47, 49, 50 and 51 U.S.C.); see In re 
Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular 
Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (discussing legislative history). 
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or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from 
which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, 
however, that such information shall not include the contents of any 
communication.”81 An order authorizing a pen register pursuant to the 
Patriot Act must specify: 
  (A) the identity, if known, of the person to whom is leased or in 
whose name is listed the telephone line or other facility to which the 
pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached or applied; 
  (B) the identity, if known, of the person who is the subject of the 
criminal investigation; 
  (C) the attributes of the communications to which the order applies, 
including the number or other identifier and, if known, the location of 
the telephone line or other facility to which the pen register or trap and 
trace device is to be attached or applied.82 
Analysis of § 3123(b)(1) reveals that, in each subsection, Congress 
inserted the language “if known” to specify that the order need only 
contain the aforementioned information if known at the time 
authorization is requested. For example, in subsection (A), the order 
need not contain the name of the person to whom the cell phone is 
leased unless that person’s name is known. Similarly, in subsection (B), 
the court order does not have to provide the name of the target of the 
investigation unless that person’s name is known. However, in subsection 
(C), Congress did not modify the language “the attributes of the 
communications to which the order applies, including the number or 
other identifier” to add “if known.” Indeed, the word “and” in that 
subsection makes clear that “the location of the telephone line or other 
facility” must be included in the order only “if known.” Consequently, 
the rest of “the attributes of communications,” including “the number or 
other identifier,” must be specified within any order authorizing any pen 
register application. 
Moreover, the inclusion of the word “facility” within the text of 
§ 3123(b)(1), in addition to “telephone line,” as covered by the pen 
register statute, does not permit law enforcement to obtain subscriber 
information without providing the cell phone number. The DOJ 
 
 81. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2012); see United States v. Jadlowe, 628 F.3d 1, 6 n.4 (1st Cir. 2010) (“A 
‘pen register’ is a device used, inter alia, to record the dialing and other information transmitted by a 
targeted phone.”). The Patriot Act distinguished a pen register from a trap and trace device, which is 
defined as “a device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which 
identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information 
reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, provided, however, that 
such information shall not include the contents of any communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4). 
 82. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added); see Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law 
Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1375, 1431–32 (2004) (“[T]he statute required the 
court order to specify the number of the ‘telephone line’ to which the pen register or trap and trace 
would be attached.”). 
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acknowledged that “facility” would include “a cellular telephone 
number” or “a specific cellular telephone identified by its electronic 
serial number.”83 Pursuant to § 3123(b)(1), pen register applicants can 
make requests when they know the cell phone number or the electronic 
serial number.84 Indeed, the DOJ’s Field Guidance on New Authorities 
that Relate to Computer Crime and Electronic Evidences suggests that a 
pen register is not appropriate when the targeted cell phone number or 
electronic serial number is unknown. Much of the significance of the 
amending language is attributable to the fact that Congress sought to 
ensure that the use of pen registers extended to new technologies, such 
as cell phones and computers.85 
Accordingly, this revision in the USA Patriot Act broadened the 
definition of a pen register. Some judges have interpreted the Patriot Act 
to expand the definition to include electronic communications in 
addition to dialing information, but not to the capture of cell site 
information.86 Others have rejected this approach, concluding that the 
Patriot Act applies to all communications to and from the targeted cell 
phone.87 Regardless of the debate over the scope of a pen register 
following the Patriot Act, courts have routinely determined that law 
enforcement submit an application to use a pen register when seeking 
information about a particular telephone.88 Indeed, the purpose of a pen 
register is to track telephone numbers, not people. 
 
 83. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Computer Crime and Intellectual Prop. Section, Field Guidance 
on New Authorities that Relate to Computer Crime and Electronic Evidence Enacted in the 
USA Patriot Act of 2001 4 (2001), available at https://www.student.cs.uwaterloo.ca/~cs492/papers/ 
ccips.pdf [hereinafter Field Guidance on New Authorities]; see Patricia Mell, Big Brother at the 
Door: Balancing National Security with Privacy Under the USA Patriot Act, 80 Denv. U. L. Rev. 375, 
402 n.226 (2002). 
 84. Field Guidance on New Authorities, supra note 83, at 4. 
 85. See id. at 5. 
 86. In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. 
Supp. 2d 747, 753 n.8 (S.D. Tex. 2005); accord In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1) 
Authorizing the Use of Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of 
Subscriber Information and/or Cell Site Information, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 318 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(adopting the reasoning of In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747). 
 87. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a 
Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see In re Application of the U.S. for an 
Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap on [xxx]Internet Service Account/User Name 
[xxxxxxxxxxx@xxx.com], 396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 49–50 (D. Mass. 2005) (“There can be no doubt that the 
expanded definition of a pen register, especially the use of the term ‘device or process,’ encompasses 
e-mail communications and communications over the internet.”) (emphasis in original). 
 88. United States v. Jadlowe, 628 F.3d 1, 6 n.4 (1st Cir. 2010); In re Applications of the U.S. for 
Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers & Trap & Trace Devices & (2) Authorizing Release 
of Subscriber Info., 515 F. Supp. 2d 325, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“In layman’s terms, a pen register is a 
device capable of recording all digits dialed from a particular telephone.”); United States v. Bermudez, 
No. IP 05-43-CR-B/F, 2006 WL 3197181, at *8 (S.D. Ind. June 30, 2006) (unpublished) (“A ‘pen 
register’ records telephone numbers dialed for outgoing calls made from the target phone.”); In re 
Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular 
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In New York Telephone, the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the 
Wiretap Act did not apply to pen registers did not also mean that the 
government could obtain pen registers without any judicial 
intervention.89 To the contrary, the Court determined that the 
government could only obtain a pen register by establishing probable 
cause, consistent with the seizure standard enunciated in Rule 41 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is based on the Fourth 
Amendment.90 Even if cell site simulators are not covered by the current 
iteration of the pen register statute, that does not grant the government 
carte blanche to use these devices without any judicial authorization. 
Instead, the appropriate approach is for the government to seek 
authorization for the use of a cell site simulator consistent with the 
requirements of Rule 41 and the Fourth Amendment. 
Congress has limited judicial review of pen register applications to 
the “ministerial” task of confirming that the government has properly 
identified the attorney and agency seeking the order as well as providing 
a certification that the information sought through the device is relevant 
to an ongoing investigation.91 When reviewing these applications, courts 
inquire neither into the veracity of the facts asserted by the government, 
nor into the reasonableness of its judgment concerning likelihood or 
relevance.92 One scholar notes that “the ECPA’s vague definition of a 
pen register, in combination with innovations in communications 
technologies and judicial permissiveness, allows law enforcement to 
acquire much communication attribute information by satisfying, at 
most, the minimal pen register procedures.”93 Consequently, the 
government is typically able to provide the proper identifications and 
 
Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (pen registers apply to particular cell phones); In re Application of the U.S. 
for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomm. Records & Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & 
Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Pen Register Statute is the statute used to obtain 
information on an ongoing or prospective basis regarding outgoing calls from a particular 
telephone.”); In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Installation & Use of a Pen Register 
& a Caller Identification Sys. on Tel. Nos. [Sealed] & [Sealed] & the Production of Real Time Cell 
Site Info., 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 602 (D. Md. 2005) (“A pen register records telephone numbers dialed 
for outgoing calls from the target phone . . .”); In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace 
Device, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 752 (“A ‘pen register’ is a device that records the numbers dialed for 
outgoing calls made from the target phone.”). 
 89. See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 170 (1977). 
 90. See id. 
 91. 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (2012); see United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(“[U]pon a proper application being made under 18 U.S.C. § 3122, ‘the court shall enter an ex parte 
order authorizing the installation’ of such a device.” (emphasis in original)). 
 92. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register 
& Trap & Trace Device, 846 F. Supp. 1555, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1994); see Mell, supra note 83, at 403. 
 93. Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes After The Digital Telephony 
Act, 69 S. Calif. L. Rev. 949, 988–89 (1996). 
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certification to satisfy this low bar.94 That low standard may be 
appropriate in applications in which law enforcement officials are truly 
seeking a traditional pen register to ascertain the numbers called from a 
specific cell phone. However, as the few known examples of requests for 
authorization to employ a cell site simulator demonstrate, the use of the 
pen register statute to support seeking materials with a cell site simulator 
is more troubling. 
IV.  Few Available Examples of Either Motions or Court Orders 
Address Cell Site Simulators & Similar Devices 
Very few judicial decisions address the use of these tools of 
electronic surveillance. One possible reason for the lack of decisions is 
that the government has attempted to keep its use of cell site simulator 
technology a secret.95 For example, law enforcement officials often file 
their applications as requests for pen registers without much, if any, 
reference to the fact that the device to be used is a different type of 
electronic surveillance than the traditional pen register.96 Moreover, 
when courts ask the government to provide legal authority for such 
electronic surveillance, pursuant to the pen register statute, the 
government is less than candid.97 Finally, various government agencies, 
both federal and state alike, have taken measures to keep their use of cell 
site simulators secret. The FBI has gone so far as to require its employees 
to sign nondisclosure agreements to prevent them from disclosing any 
information about the government’s use of cell site simulators.98 There 
 
 94. See Bellia, supra note 82, at 1431 (“[T]he statute does not appear to require the judge to 
independently assess the factual predicate for the government’s certification.”); Lee, supra note 25, at 
397 (“Pen register and trap and trace authority is also problematic in that orders are generally 
rubberstamped without question.”). But see In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing 
the Installation & Use of a Device [Pen Register], No. 87-0831RC, 1987 WL 8946 (D. Mass. Apr. 3, 
1987) (denying a pen register without prejudice due to deficiencies in the application). 
 95. See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. FBI, 933 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D.D.C. 2013) (denying the FBI’s 
motion for a stay of deadline to provide responses to Freedom of Information Act requests regarding 
StingRay); Paul Ohm, Electronic Surveillance Law and the Intra-Agency Separation of Powers, 
47 U.S.F. L. Rev. 269, 275 (2012) (discussing rumors of various types of electronic surveillance, 
including StingRays, that have ultimately been confirmed); Kurth & Abdel-Razzaq, supra note 11; 
Nathan Freed Wessler, U.S. Marshals Seize Local Cops’ Cell Phone Tracking Files in Extraordinary 
Attempt to Keep Information From Public, ACLU (June 3, 2014, 12:13 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/us-marshals-seize-local-cops-cell-
phone-tracking-files (discussing the federal government’s efforts to prevent disclosure of information 
related to the Sarasota Police Department’s use of a cell site simulator). 
 96. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen 
Register & Trap & Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747, 747 (S.D. Tex. 2012). 
 97. Owsley, supra note 15, at 40; Pell & Soghoian, supra note 16, at 158. 
 98. Ryan Gallagher, Judge Oks FBI Tracking Tool That Tricks Cellphones with Clandestine Signal, 
Slate (May 9, 2013, 4:35 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/05/09/ 
stingray_imsi_catcher_judge_oks_fbi_use_of_controversial_tool_in_daniel.html. Obviously, these 
nondisclosure agreements do not apply to FBI agents seeking judicial authorization. See Wessler, supra 
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are also allegations that the Sarasota Police Department distorted its 
response to the court regarding its use of a StingRay.99 
Indeed, in one case that I heard as a federal magistrate judge, the 
Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) who appeared before me 
repeatedly indicated that a legal memorandum would be forthcoming, 
but instead filed a motion to withdraw after a month. In another case the 
federal prosecutor indicated that he would provide legal authority the 
next day, but ultimately did not provide any such support.100 The 
magistrate judge hearing the case informed the AUSA that there were 
some problems with the application.101 Despite providing feedback and 
guidance, the magistrate judge never heard from the applicant.102 
Existing decisions reveal that the government filed such applications 
pursuant to the pen register statute. With the exception of one published 
decision, they all address the standard after the amendments in the USA 
Patriot Act. Additionally, few, if any, form motions and orders created 
by law enforcement officials exist. 
A. Court Orders Addressing Applications for Digital Analyzers 
and Cell Site Simulators 
1. The Central District of California 
One of the first known decisions discussing law enforcement’s use of 
this technology involves an application by the government for 
authorization to use a digital analyzer.103 This is the only published 
decision addressing such electronic surveillance devices prior to the USA 
Patriot Act. 
In this application, the government could not identify the cell 
phones of any of the five subjects of its narcotics investigation, but 
 
note 59 (discussing the FBI’s attempt to keep sealed testimony about the Tallahassee Police 
Department’s use of a StingRay); Kurth & Abdel-Razzaq, supra note 11. 
 99. Cyrus Farivar, Legal Experts: Cops Lying About Cell Tracking “Is a Stupid Thing to Do,” 
Ars Technica (June 20, 2014, 9:38 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/06/legal-experts-cops-
lying-about-cell-tracking-is-a-stupid-thing-to-do. 
 100. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen 
Register & Trap & Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 749. 
 101. E-mail from Magistrate Judge, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, to Brian 
Owsley (Mar. 5, 2013, 10:58 AM) (on file with author). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See generally In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Cellular 
Tel. Digital Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. 197 (C.D. Cal. 1995); see also Fourth Amendment and the 
Internet: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 
106th Cong. 165–66 (2000), available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju66503.000/ 
hju66503_0.htm (prepared statement of Robert Corn-Revere, Att’y, Hogan & Hartson L.L.P.) 
(discussing the decision from the Central District of California). 
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instead sought to analyze the signals from these subjects’ cell phones.104 
Specifically, the applicant indicated that the investigators would 
“conduct surveillance of the subjects of the investigation, and when they 
observe[d] a subject using a cellular telephone, they [would] turn on the 
digital analyzer.”105 At that time they would obtain the information 
related to the specific cellular telephone that the subject was using. 
Although the application sought a court order for the digital 
analyzer pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3123, the government maintained that a 
court order was not necessary.106 The trial court agreed, reasoning that 
the Fourth Amendment did not afford the subjects of a criminal 
investigation a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their 
telephone numbers.107 The court further explained that the pen register 
statute did not apply to the government’s application because the statute 
contemplated investigation of a specific phone, whereas in this instance, 
law enforcement was targeting the individuals using the phones.108 
Although the pen register statute did not apply per se, the court 
found that the spirit of the statute covered the intended activity. 
Applying the requirements of the statute, the court found the proposed 
order deficient. First, because the telephone numbers of the subjects of 
the investigation were unknown, it would be impossible to comply with 
the statute.109 The court concluded that in passing the pen register 
statute, Congress had two principal concerns: “(1) the abusive 
interception of communications and (2) the accountability of law 
enforcement officers using advanced technology that might threaten 
privacy rights.”110 The trial court specifically expressed concern about the 
digital analyzer intercepting the “telephone numbers and calls made by 
others than the subjects of the investigation.”111 Additionally, because 
the proposed court order did not list the specific telephone numbers to 
be targeted by the digital analyzer, the order should have included “a 
 
 104. In re Application for Use of a Cellular Tel. Digital Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. at 199. 
 105. Id. at 200. 
 106. Id. at 199. 
 107. Id. (discussing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–45 (1979)); see Pell & Soghoian, supra 
note 16, at 157–58. 
 108. In re Application for Use of a Cellular Tel. Digital Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. at 199–200; see 
Freiwald, supra note 93, at 988–89 (“The court, having refused to consider the device a pen register 
since it did not attach to a telephone line, found that no court order of any kind was required to use 
the device.”); Fourth Amendment and the Internet: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 106th Cong. 165 (2000) (prepared statement of 
Robert Corn-Revere, Att’y, Hogan & Hartson L.L.P.) (noting, regarding this decision, that 
“[c]onsistent with the statutory language and legislative history, reviewing courts have interpreted 
these provisions literally, and narrowly”). 
 109. In re Application for Use of a Cellular Tel. Digital Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. at 201 (discussing 
§ 3123(b)(1)(C)). 
 110. Id. at 201. 
 111. Id. 
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requirement that the investigative agency maintain a time log identifying 
each target cellular telephone analyzed (by ESN and telephone number), 
together with all intercepted telephone numbers dialed or pulsed from 
each such telephone.”112 Because the application did not include the 
numbers or this requirement, the court denied the application without 
prejudice.113 
2. The Southern District of Texas 
a. The Use of a Cell Site Simulator in a Prison Setting 
Since the enactment of the USA Patriot Act in 2001, there have 
been a few examples of applications for cell site simulators in federal 
court. In April of 2011, for example, the government filed an application 
for a pen register in the Southern District of Texas.114 Specifically, the 
AUSA indicated that the government suspected that federal prison 
inmates were using cellular phones to perpetrate various federal 
offenses.115 The government knew the names of the suspects, their 
location, and the location where they typically used their cell phones;116 
however, it did not know the phone numbers or in whose names the 
phones were purchased or leased.117 To advance its investigation, federal 
law enforcement agents sought an order authorizing the installation of a 
pen register and a trap and trace device.118 In the application, the 
government requested authority to use a device that could ascertain the 
number of any cell phones operating within a particular area, including 
the prison facilities.119 According to the AUSA’s statements during ex 
parte discussions, the device functioned by impersonating a cell tower, 
thereby receiving all of the signals sent from any nearby cellular 
phones.120 
The government acknowledged that the device would capture the 
phone numbers of other phones that happened to be in the vicinity, but 
was confident in its ability to quickly winnow those numbers out and 
target the phones being used by the suspects.121 The AUSA did not 
indicate how this winnowing process would be done. When asked about 
 
 112. Id. at 202. 
 113. Id. 
 114. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen 
Register & Trap & Trace Device, No. 2:11-mj-00468 (S.D. Tex Apr. 6, 2011). 
 115. Id. at 1. 
 116. Id. at 2. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1. 
 119. Id. at 2. 
 120. Hearing Minutes, In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & 
Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, No. 2:11-mj-00468 (S.D. Tex. May 6, 2011). 
 121. Id. at 2–3. 
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legal authority supporting the government’s application, the Court was 
advised that a brief with legal support would be filed. 
Instead of filing this legal brief, about a month after the application 
was filed, the government filed a motion to withdraw the application 
because prison officials had discovered and confiscated the cellular 
telephones that the government was trying to locate.122 Because the 
application was moot, the motion to withdraw was granted.123 
b. The Use of a Cell Site Simulator to Target a Drug Dealer 
In another application before the Southern District of Texas, the 
government sought a pen register and a trap and trace regarding a Drug 
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) investigation.124 The underlying 
investigation focused on an individual who was allegedly engaged in 
narcotics trafficking, based on an investigation of a number of years.125 In 
its application, the government acknowledged that it did not know the 
telephone number of the cell phone used by the subject of the 
investigation.126 During an ex parte hearing, the federal agent in charge 
of the investigation acknowledged that the application sought to use a 
StingRay device “to detect radio signals emitted from wireless cellular 
telephones in the vicinity of the [Subject] that identify the telephones.”127 
Specifically, he explained that if the application were granted, the device 
would be employed from a vehicle that would be driven near the home 
of the subject of the investigation; that same vehicle would also follow 
the subject when he went other places during the period of 
surveillance.128 In this manner, the agents hoped that a common cell 
phone number would materialize from the numbers obtained at the 
various surveillance-gathering locations. 
The AUSA indicated “that the application was based on a standard 
application model and proposed order approved by the United States 
Department of Justice” for use by federal prosecutors.129 During the 
hearing, the AUSA was unfamiliar with some case law raised during the 
 
 122. See generally id. 
 123. Order Granting Mot. to Withdraw, In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the 
Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, No. 2:11-mj-00468 (S.D. Tex. May 6, 
2011).  
 124. See generally In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of 
a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2012); see also Pell & 
Soghoian, supra note 16, at 160–62. 
 125. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen 
Register & Trap & Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 748. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.; accord Pell & Soghoian, supra note 16, at 161. 
 128. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen 
Register & Trap & Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 748. 
 129. Id. at 749; see Electronic Surveillance Manual, supra note 24, at 38–40. 
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discussion, but represented to the court that he would file a legal 
memorandum in support of his application the next day.130 However, that 
legal support was never provided to the court.131 
In its analysis of the application, the court first discussed the 
historical view of pen registers.132 Next, it discussed the revised definition 
of a pen register based on the USA Patriot Act.133 Notwithstanding the 
broader definition of a pen register in the Patriot Act, the court found 
that the statute and case law required that the pen register applicant be 
targeting a known telephone number.134 According to the judge, “the 
plain language of the statute mandates that this Court have a telephone 
number or some similar identifier before issuing an order authorizing a 
pen register.”135 In other words, given the absence of a known cell phone 
number target, neither case law nor statutory language supported the 
applicability of the pen register statute to an application for a cell site 
simulator. 
3. The Northern District of Texas 
In an application filed in the Northern District of Texas in 2012, the 
government sought an order authorizing a pen register regarding the 
cellular phones used by the subject of an ongoing narcotics trafficking 
investigation. The alleged violations were possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 841 and for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 
cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 846.136 The ASUA represented that the subject of the investigation was 
using one or more unidentified cellular phones.137 The government knew 
that this subject lived at one specific location and frequented another 
where he worked.138 However, the government did not know the cell 
 
 130. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen 
Register & Trap & Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 749. 
 131. Id. at 749 n.1. 
 132. Id. at 749 (discussing United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 512 n.2 (1974) and United 
States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1(1977)). 
 133. Id. at 749. 
 134. Id. at 750–51; see Gus Hosein & Caroline Wilson Palow, Modern Safeguards for Modern 
Surveillance: An Analysis of Innovations in Communications Surveillance Techniques, 74 Ohio St. 
L.J. 1071, 1102 (2013). 
 135. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen 
Register and Trap and Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 751 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 3123(b)(1)(C)); 
Pell & Soghoian, supra note 16, at 161. 
 136. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen 
Register & Trap & Trace Device (N.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2012) (on file with author). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
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phone subscriber information of the persons leasing the cell phones that 
the subject was using.139 
In its application, the government explained that it sought to use the 
pen register to simply identify the subject’s telephone number, as 
opposed to tracking the cell phone or attempting to determine its 
location.140 Consequently, the use of surveillance equipment was to be 
limited: “Once the identifying registration data and the number of the 
Subject Telephone is identified, utilization of the pen register . . . shall 
cease.”141 
The court granted the government’s application; however, the judge 
did impose some limits on the government’s use of these devices.142 The 
judge mandated that the order applied only to the cell phone used by the 
subject, and that the cell site simulator was to be used only in the 
subject’s vicinity to ascertain his cell phone number.143 Additionally, the 
judge specifically barred the use of the cell site simulator “when the 
Subject [was] in a location in which he would have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy; including but not limited to: a private residence, a 
vehicle, or a private office.”144 Once the subject’s cell phone number was 
determined, the government was ordered to cease using the cell site 
simulator.145 The government was apparently displeased with the court’s 
conditions and ultimately did not use a cell site simulator.146 Indeed, the 
AUSA informed the magistrate judge that the restrictions were too 
onerous.147 
4. The District of Maryland 
In an application filed in the District of Maryland in 2012, the 
government sought an order relating to the cellular phones used by the 
subject of an ongoing narcotics trafficking investigation for alleged 
violations of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances.148 
Specifically, the government sought to use a device to obtain “certain 
unknown mobile telephone(s) presently with unknown call number(s); 
unknown subscriber(s); and unknown service provider(s)” used by the 
 
 139. Id. at 1–2. 
 140. Id. at 2–3. 
 141. Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). 
 142. Order Granting, In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & 
Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device (N.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2012).  
 143. Id. at 2. 
 144. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 145. Id. 
 146. E-mail from Magistrate Judge, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, to Brian 
Owsley (June 4, 2012, 11:49 AM) (on file with author). 
 147. Id. 
 148. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen 
Register/Trap & Trace Device, No. [Redacted] (D. Md. Mar. [Redacted], 2012). 
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subject of the ongoing investigation.149 The AUSA elaborated that “[t]he 
purpose of this requested order is to identify this unknown information 
by deploying the device to the Target Telephone(s).”150 
The AUSA indicated that the cell site simulator would “detect radio 
signals emitted from wireless cellular telephones in the vicinity of the 
target, including the Target Telephone(s).”151 The AUSA further 
explained that “[b]y determining the identifying registration data at 
various locations in which the subject telephone is reasonably believed to 
be operating, the telephone number(s) and/or subscriber identities 
corresponding to the Target Telephone(s) can be identified.”152 The 
government acknowledged that, by using the device, it would invariably 
capture the telephone numbers of innocent third parties.153 
The application requested the court to order that, when the federal 
agents obtained information from the search, they were “to log the 
identity of each cellphone analyzed, together with the intercepted 
subscriber identities for each device.”154 Moreover, it sought an order 
requiring that the government “avoid the collection of data from 
individuals other than that of the target.”155 
Interestingly, the government asserted that the 1995 Central District 
of California opinion provided support for its application.156 Although 
the application acknowledged that the 1995 decision was not favorable to 
the government, the decision provided guidance as to what any 
subsequent applications should contain.157 Finally, the AUSA 
maintained that the application and the attached proposed order pending 
before the Maryland district court adhered to the dictates from the 1995 
decision.158 
5. The District of New Jersey 
In an application filed in the District of New Jersey in 2012, the 
government sought an order authorizing a pen register and trap and 
trace device as well as subscriber information, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 2. 
 151. Id.at 3 n.4. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 3–4, 4 n.5. 
 154. Id. at 4. 
 155. Id. at 5. 
 156. Id. at 3 n.3 (citing In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a 
Cellular Tel. Digital Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. 197 (C.D. Cal. 1995)). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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§ 2703.159 The government knew the targeted cell phone number and that 
it was issued by Simple Mobile through its relationship with T-Mobile.160 
Because the location of the targeted cell phone was unknown, the 
application also sought authorization for “the FBI to deploy mobile pen 
register and trap and trace equipment to determine the general location 
of the cellular telephone facility assigned [to the specific] telephone 
number.”161 The court authorized the use of this “mobile pen register 
equipment” “in order to determine the general location” of the cell 
phone.162 However, the court limited the FBI from “us[ing] the mobile 
equipment, absent other authority, to locate the Target Facility once it 
leads them to believe that they have identified a single residence or 
private space within which the Target Facility may be located.”163 
6. The District of Arizona 
In a criminal prosecution in the District of Arizona, the government 
sought the defendant, a fugitive indicted on 74 counts of mail and wire 
fraud, aggravated identity theft, and conspiracy.164 “The government 
located and arrested Defendant, in part, by tracking the location of an 
aircard connected to a laptop computer that allegedly was used to 
perpetuate the fraudulent scheme.”165 
After the defendant’s arrest, he filed a motion for disclosure of 
evidence, as well as additional discovery. Specifically, he sought 
extremely detailed information regarding the aircard, as well as the 
identities and training of the FBI agents capable of using this 
technology.166 In support of the defendant’s motion, the American Civil 
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) filed an amicus brief arguing that because 
the AUSA seeking the original order authorizing the use of the StingRay 
failed “to apprise the magistrate that it intended to use a stingray, what 
the device is, and how it works, it prevented the judge from exercising his 
 
 159. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen 
Register and Trap and Trace Device for the Cellular Telephone Facility Currently Assigned 
Telephone Number [Redacted], Mag. No. 12-3016 (D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2012). 
 160. Id. at 1. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 4. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See Rigmaiden I, 844 F. Supp. 2d 982, 987–88 (D. Ariz. 2012). 
 165. Id. “Air cards are devices that plug into a computer and use the wireless cellular networks of 
phone providers to connect the computer to the internet. The devices are not phones and therefore 
don’t have the ability to receive incoming calls . . .” Kim Zetter, Secrets of FBI Smartphone 
Surveillance Tool Revealed in Court Fight, Wired (Apr. 9, 2013, 6:30 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/04/verizon-rigmaiden-aircard/all. 
 166. Rigmaiden I, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 993. 
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constitutional function of ensuring that warrants are not overly intrusive 
and all aspects of the search are supported by probable cause.”167 
The government stipulated to a number of facts related to the 
motion for discovery, as well as the motion to suppress. It agreed that 
“[t]he mobile tracking device used by the FBI to locate the aircard 
function[ed] as a cell-site simulator. The mobile tracking device 
mimicked a Verizon Wireless cell tower and sent signals to, and received 
signals from, the aircard.”168 Additionally, the government acknowledged 
that “[t]he FBI used the mobile tracking device in multiple locations,” 
taking readings and then moving to another location to take more 
readings.169 
In locating the defendant with the use of the cell site simulator 
device, the government indicated that “[t]he FBI never used more than a 
single piece of equipment at any given time.”170 Moreover, the agents 
using the device were on foot near the defendant’s apartment.171 During 
that surveillance, these agents made telephone calls to the aircard.172 The 
government indicated that “[t]he mobile tracking device used to simulate 
a Verizon cell tower [was] physically separate from the pen register trap 
and trace device used to collect information from Verizon.”173 Finally, 
for purposes of the defendant’s pending motion, the government stipulated 
that “[t]he tracking operation was a Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure.”174 
In July 2008, the government obtained a warrant pursuant to 
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure from a magistrate 
judge in the Northern District of California authorizing the use of the 
StingRay device to locate the aircard.175 In finding probable cause, the 
magistrate judge identified the aircard by both its specific assigned 
telephone number as well as its ESN.176 In the motion to suppress, the 
defendant argued that the government’s use of the device to track the 
aircard violated his Fourth Amendment rights.177 Specifically, he argued 
“that the warrant is not supported by probable cause, that it lacks 
particularity, that the government’s searches and seizures exceeded the 
warrant’s scope, and that agents executed the warrant unreasonably 
 
 167. [Proposed] Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Daniel Rigmaiden’s Motion to Suppress at 14, 
Rigmaiden II, No. CR 08-814-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1932800 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013). 
 168. Rigmaiden I, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 995. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 995–96. 
 175. Rigmaiden II, No. CR 08-814-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1932800, at *14 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
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because they failed to comply with inventory and return 
requirements.”178 
The district court judge found that the agent’s affidavit in support of 
the warrant clearly linked locating the aircard with a high likelihood that 
it would lead to evidence of criminal activity.179 Furthermore, the court 
noted that the agent’s affidavit specifically indicated that the authorized 
device was used to locate the aircard.180 Next, the court concluded that 
the warrant was sufficiently particular based on the use of the specific 
telephone number and the ESN identifying the aircard.181 Regarding any 
argument for privacy by the defendant, the judge concluded that the 
defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in light of the 
fact that he obtained his residence and the computers through identity 
theft and other fraudulent means.182 
Regarding the scope of the warrant, defendant argued that Verizon, 
rather than the FBI, was authorized to search for the aircard.183 Again, 
the court rejected this argument, noting that while the warrant was “not a 
model of clarity,” it satisfied the standard mandated by Rule 41.184 
Ultimately, the court denied the motion to suppress the evidence related 
to the aircard in part because the defendant did not have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in his aircard.185 
7. Other Magistrate Judges Have Acknowledged Handling Cell 
Site Simulator Applications 
Of course, the above discussion is not exhaustive, as other 
magistrate judges may have received applications using the pen register 
application and not realized that they were authorizing or denying use of 
a cell site simulator.186 One magistrate judge in the Western District of 
Washington explained that he received a request for a TriggerFish in 
2011, which he denied.187 Similarly, a magistrate judge in the Eastern 
District of Texas was faced with a pen register application for a cell site 
simulator.188 He indicated some concerns that he had with the request 
and sought some revisions, or in the alternative, some authority in 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at *16. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at *17. 
 182. Id. at *8–9. 
 183. Id. at *18. 
 184. Id. at *19. 
 185. Id. at *33–34. 
 186. Soghoian, supra note 37. 
 187. E-mail from Magistrate Judge, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, to 
Brian Owsley (May 31, 2012, 11:40 AM) (on file with author). 
 188. E-mail from Magistrate Judge, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, to Brian 
Owsley (Mar. 5, 2013, 10:58 AM) (on file with author). 
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support of the requested application.189 Ultimately, the AUSA withdrew 
the application.190 
Another magistrate judge indicated that he and his colleagues in the 
Southern District of California routinely grant requests for cell site 
simulators because people do not have any expectation of privacy in 
their telephone numbers.191 He did note that an authorization covered 
only the recording of the ESN and MIN numbers transmitted to the 
telecommunication providers by cell phone.192 
B. Form Applications and Orders Drafted by Law Enforcement 
Agencies 
In addition to these judicial examples addressing government 
applications to use cell site simulators, law enforcement officials have 
provided other examples in their training manuals. 
1. The United States Attorneys’ Bulletin 
In a September 1997 United States Attorneys’ Bulletin, the 
Electronic Surveillance Unit of the Officer of Enforcement Operations 
within the Criminal Division of the DOJ issued guidance regarding 
certain electronic surveillance techniques, including digital analyzers and 
cell site simulators.193 This Bulletin explained that “[i]t is now possible 
for agents to capture electronically the unknown [ESN] or telephone 
number of a cellular telephone through the use of a device known as a 
digital analyzer.”194 It further explained that a digital analyzer “can be 
programmed to identify the telephone number assigned to the subject 
cellular telephone and telephone numbers dialed from this phone, as well 
as its ESN; i.e. a number assigned by the cellular telephone manufacturer 
and programmed into the telephone.”195 The Bulletin explicitly 
acknowledged that, because a digital analyzer is capable of intercepting 
communications as well as telephone numbers, the device “is 
programmed so it will not intercept cellular conversations or dialed 
 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. E-mail from Magistrate Judge, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, to 
Brian Owsley (May 31, 2012, 1:01 PM) (on file with author). 
 192. Id.; see United States v. Espudo, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1045 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (denying as moot 
a motion to suppress evidence obtained by a cell site simulator where the federal agent testified that 
the information gathered was not “utilized to further the investigation”). 
 193. The Office of Enforcement Operations—Its Role in the Area of Electronic Surveillance, 
45 U.S. Att’y Bull., no. 5, Sept. 1997, at 8, 11, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/ 
usab4505.pdf. 
 194. Id. at 13 (emphasis in original). 
 195. Id. at 13–14. 
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numbers when it is used for the limited purpose of seizing ESNs and/or 
the cellular telephone’s number.”196 
The Bulletin also discussed cell site simulators, explaining that they 
“can provide agents with a cellular telephone’s ESN and mobile 
identification number (‘MIN,’ which contains the cellular telephone 
number and other information related to the operation of the phone).”197 
Next, it elaborated that cell site simulators: 
[S]imulate[] some of the activities of a cellular service provider’s cell 
site transmitter, albeit in a much smaller area, and allow[] agents to 
query cellular phones for their ESNs and MINs through “autonomous 
registration,” an activity a cell site transmitter normally conducts to 
identify cellular phones operating within its cell or area.198  
Finally, the Bulletin discussed that as with “a real cell site transmitter, the 
[cell site simulator] can determine ESNs and MINs of cellular phones that 
are ‘powered up’ or turned on. (The phone need not be in a ‘use’ mode; the 
information can be obtained unbeknownst to the cellular phone user.)”199 
The Bulletin discussed that both digital analyzers and cell site 
simulators: 
[C]an capture the cell site codes identifying the cell location and 
geographical sub-sector from which the cellular telephone is 
transmitting; the call’s incoming or outgoing status; the telephone 
numbers dialed (pen register order required); and the date, time, and 
duration of the call. This cell site data is transmitted continuously from 
a cellular telephone (not by the user) as a necessary part of call 
direction and processing.200  
Each telecommunications provider “uses this information to connect 
with the account in order to direct calls, and constantly reports to the 
customer’s telephone a readout regarding the signal power, status, and 
mode of the telephone.”201 
2. The Department of Justice Electronic Surveillance Manual 
In 2005, the DOJ published an Electronic Surveillance Manual to 
provide guidance to its attorneys throughout the country. Specifically, 
the Electronic Surveillance Manual “sets forth the procedures 
established by the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice to 
obtain authorization to conduct electronic surveillance.”202 The manual, 
last revised in 2005, discusses digital analyzers in a section concerning 
 
 196. Id. at 14. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Electronic Surveillance Manual, supra note 24, at ii. 
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pen registers and trap and trace devices.203 It explicitly cautions the need 
for a court order prior to using a cell site simulator: 
Because section 3127 of Title 18 defines pen registers and trap and 
trace devices in terms of recording, decoding or capturing dialing, 
routing, addressing, or signaling information, a pen register/trap and 
trace order must be obtained by the government before it can use its 
own device to capture the ESN or MIN of a cellular telephone, even 
though there will be no involvement by the service provider.204 
This determination by the DOJ, that a device used only to obtain a MIN 
requires a court order, indicates that a device used to ascertain the 
telephone number would also require a court order. 
In the Electronic Surveillance Manual, the DOJ explained that 
“[l]aw enforcement possesses electronic devices that allow agents to 
determine the location of certain cellular phones by the electronic signals 
that they broadcast.”205 Specifically, a cell site simulator’s “equipment 
includes an antenna, an electronic device that processes the signals 
transmitted on cell phone frequencies, and a laptop computer that 
analyzes the signals and allows the agent to configure the collection of 
information.”206 
The DOJ does not describe a device used to ascertain a phone 
number as a pen register. However, it demonstrates a belief that the 
same legal standards apply to such devices. The point is made explicit in 
the model form application and proposed order for a TriggerFish, a 
digital analyzer.207 The caption for the application reads “In the Matter 
of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing the 
Installation and Use of a Pen Register.”208 Moreover, the caption on the 
proposed order reads similarly.209 
3. The District of Arizona Form 
In 2012, the Acting United States Attorney for the District of 
Arizona created a form application to guide attorneys in that office in 
 
 203. Id. at 38–41. 
 204. Electronic Surveillance Manual, supra note 24, at 41. The MIN used to be the same as the 
assigned cell phone number. United States v. O’Shield, No. 97-2493, 1998 WL 104625, at *1 n.1 (7th 
Cir. Mar. 6, 1998) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision); United States v. Bailey, 41 F.3d 413, 415 
(9th Cir. 1994). Pursuant to Federal Communications Commission policy, these numbers are now 
separate. Cellular Telecomms. Indus. Ass’n’s Petition for Forbearance from Commercial Mobile 
Radio Servs. No. Portability Obligations & Tel. No. Portability, 14 FCC Rcd. 3092, 3105 (1999); see 
Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 439–40 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 205. Id. at 44. 
 206. Id.; compare with Valentino-Devries, supra note 49. 
 207. Electronic Surveillance Manual, supra note 24, at 171–74. 
 208. Id. at 171. 
 209. Id. at 173. 
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requesting ESN identification numbers.210 In the form application, the 
AUSA sought a court order “pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3122 and 3123, 
authorizing law enforcement to use an electronic serial number identifier 
to collect non-content wireless signaling information.”211 The caption on 
the application reads, “In the Matter of the Application of the United 
States of America for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Mobile Number 
Recorder to Collect Non-Content Signaling Information from Cellular 
Telephones.”212 Although the form anticipates that the requesting 
officials have the name of a subject of the investigation, it does not 
anticipate them having the cellular telephone numbers used by the 
subject or his drug trafficking organization, assuming the case pertains to 
drug trafficking.213 The application explains that a “Mobile Number 
Recorder . . . is an instrument that will decode and/or record non-content 
signaling information transmitted by a cellular telephone within a limited 
radius to determine the unique numeric identifiers of the telephone or 
telephones.”214 The form indicates that agents seek to use the Mobile 
Number Recorder in conjunction with traditional physical surveillance 
on the subject, such as by tracking the subject in an unmarked van, to 
obtain telephone numbers.215 
In support of the application, the government must certify the 
relevance of the telephone numbers sought.216 The form acknowledges 
that the mobile number recorder will gather telephone numbers 
unrelated to the subject, but asserts that these unrelated numbers will not 
be used by the investigating agents.217 Additionally, it acknowledges that 
the device might also gather dialed digit information and posits that such 
information will be usable by the government pursuant to the pen 
register statute.218 Next, the application contains blanks in which the 
government is to provide the specific criminal offenses that the subject 
allegedly committed, as well as specific facts in support of the 
application.219 The government notes that it does not need to provide 
“specific and articulable facts” in support of its application because it will 
 
 210. U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Ariz., Application for Use of an Electronic Serial 
Number Identifier [hereinafter Arizona Form Application] (2012) (on file with author). Acting 
United States Attorney Ann Birmingham Scheel served until July 3, 2012, when the new United States 
Attorney was sworn in. See Meet the U.S. Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ 
az/meettheattorney.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). 
 211. Arizona Form Application, supra note 210, at 1. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 1–2. 
 216. Id. at 2. 
 217. Id. at 4. 
 218. Id. at 4–5. 
 219. Id. at 5. 
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simply be using the pen register statute to obtain the subject’s cell phone 
numbers with the mobile number recorder.220 
The government also included, in this package to attorneys, a 
memorandum in support of its position. In the memorandum, the 
government argues that the mobile number recorder falls within the pen 
register statute as it is a recording of signaling information.221 The 
memorandum also discusses the difference in the pen register definition 
in the ECPA with the amendment in the USA Patriot Act.222 The 
government also argues that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to 
the use of a mobile number recorder.223 
The memorandum also provides an argument against the pen 
register statute’s applicability to the mobile number recorder.224 
Specifically, it notes that any court order must “include[] the number or 
other identifier.”225 The government acknowledges that, since the 2001 
amendment, “no court has held that a device like the one in this case falls 
within the statutory definition of a pen register.”226 Instead, it addresses 
the fact that at least one court viewing the 2001 amendments simply 
focused on applying the pen register statute to e-mails.227 Consequently, 
that court determined that a “pen register must still be tied to an actual 
number or attempted phone call.”228 
The government also provided a proposed order to grant its 
application.229 The proposed order follows the rationale provided by the 
application.230 
4. The Los Angeles Police Department Form 
At least one city has also developed form materials for use by its law 
enforcement officers. On September 29, 2012, Donal Brown, an editor at 
the First Amendment Coalition, filed a California Public Records Act 
Request with the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) for 
information regarding the use of devices to track and identify a cellular 
 
 220. Id. at 6. 
 221. Id. at 9. 
 222. Id. at 10. 
 223. Id. at 13–14 (discussing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) and United States v. Forrester, 
495 F.3d 1041, 1049–50 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 224. Id. at 11. 
 225. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3123(b)(1)(C)). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 11–12 (discussing In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site 
Location Authorization, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 761–62 (S.D. Tex. 2005)). 
 228. Id. at 12 (discussing In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 
762). 
 229. Id. at 13–15. 
 230. Id.  
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phone’s IMSI.231 Among the various requests, Brown sought “[a] copy of 
any LAPD internal policies, guidelines or standards for police use of an 
IMSI device” or in lieu of such records “all other records sufficient to 
show the policies, guidelines or standards in effect for LAPD use of an 
IMSI device.”232 Next, he requested “[r]ecords sufficient to show whether 
judicial authorization is obtained for LAPD deployment and use of an 
IMSI device and the type of judicial authorization obtained.”233 He also 
asked for “[r]ecords sufficient to show, for the time period June 1 [to] 
Sept. 30, 2012, the frequency of LAPD’s deployment and use of an IMSI 
device,” as well as, for the same time period, “[r]ecords sufficient to 
show . . . all LAPD uses of an IMSI device in which LAPD personnel 
eavesdropped on conversation.”234 Finally, he requested “[r]ecords 
sufficient to identify all prosecutions or other judicial proceedings 
initiated by the LAPD or LA District Attorney during 2011 in which 
information was filed in, or furnished to, the Superior Court (LA 
County) derived from LAPD’s use of an IMSI device.”235 Brown asked 
that a response be provided within ten days.236 
On December 14, 2012, Officer Martin Bland, the Officer-in-Charge 
of the Discovery Section within the Legal Affairs Division of the LAPD, 
responded to Brown’s records request.237 With respect to the first three 
requests, Bland indicated that he would make documents available after 
Brown paid the duplicating fee.238 Bland then acknowledged that, 
“[d]uring the time period in your request, 21 cell phone numbers were 
subjected to the deployment of an IMSI,” but “there were no uses of an 
IMSI device that involved the eavesdropping of conversations.”239 
Finally, Bland declined to provide any information in response to the 
request regarding prosecutions involving an IMSI device because “there 
is no centralized repository for records (or information) responsive to 
[the] request,” which made the request “significantly and unduly 
burdensome.”240 
 
 231. Letter from Donal Brown, Editor, First Amendment Coal., to Martin Bland, Officer-in-
Charge, Discovery Section, L.A. Police Dep’t (Sept. 29, 2012) (citing Cal. Gov. Code § 6250, et seq.), 
available at firstamendmentcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/LAPD-CPRA.pdf. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id.  
 237. Letter from Martin Bland, Officer-in-Charge, Discovery Section, L.A. Police Dep’t, to Donal 
Brown, Editor, First Amendment Coal. (Dec. 14, 2012), available at firstamendmentcoalition.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/LAPD-CPRA.pdf. 
 238. Id.  
 239. Id.  
 240. Id. (citing Cal. Gov. Code § 6255). 
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On December 28, 2012, Bland provided Brown with thirty-one 
pages of records responsive to his request.241 Notably, there was an 
October 16, 2012 memorandum to all Commanding Officers explaining 
that “[t]he law regarding the use of cellular and GPS tracking is evolving. 
Protocols governing cellphone tracking requests are necessary to ensure 
Department personnel are abiding by the most current case law.”242 
Consequently, the memorandum mandated that “[a]ll requests for 
cellular tracking, made concurrent with an investigation (whether by use 
of a court order or under an exigent circumstances process), shall be 
directed through [the Real-Time Analysis and Critical Division].”243 
In the December 28, 2012 letter from Bland to Brown, Bland 
provided an explanation of the statutory basis and procedures for 
requesting applications and court orders that use a “cell phone tracking 
system for identifying” a cell phone’s IMSI, as well as forms for 
applications and orders.244 Notably, in response to Brown’s request, 
Bland turned over an LAPD form application addressing requests for 
authorization of an IMSI device in the Superior Court for the County of 
Los Angeles.245 The caption reads, “In the Matter of the Application of 
the People of the State of California for an Order Authorizing the Use of 
a Pen Register and a Trap-and-Trace Device on Telephone Line 
Currently Designated by Telephone Number,” with a blank space to fill 
in the specific telephone number.246 The application sought to distinguish 
between a telephone number and a telephone line because it maintained 
that the pen register statute was “defined with respect to telephone 
lines” as opposed to telephone numbers.247 The application contained a 
section to be filled in by the police officer indicating the probable cause 
that supported the request.248 
 
 241. Letter from Martin Bland, Officer-in-Charge, Discovery Section, L.A. Police Dep’t, to Donal 
Brown, First Amendment Coal. (Dec. 28, 2012), available at firstamendmentcoalition.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/LAPD-CPRA.pdf. 
 242. Memorandum from Kirk J. Albanese, Chief of Detectives, L.A. Police Dep’t & Stephen R. 
Jacobs, Chief of Staff, L.A. Police Dep’t to All Commanding Officers (Oct. 16, 2012), available at 
firstamendmentcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/LAPD-CPRA.pdf. Indeed, earlier that year, 
the Supreme Court had concluded that the attachment of a GPS tracking device to the defendant’s car, 
whereby the government monitored its movement on public streets, constituted a Fourth Amendment 
search and affirmed the suppression of the resulting evidence. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945, 964 (2012). 
 243. Memorandum from Kirk J. Albanese & Stephen R. Jacobs to All Commanding Officers, 
supra note 242. 
 244. Letter from Martin Bland to Donal Brown, supra note 241. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id.  
 247. Id.  
 248. Id.  
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With this form application, the LAPD also provided a proposed 
order.249 In support of its recommendation, the LAPD proposed citing 
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)250 as the statutory authority for the order, 
notwithstanding the fact that the form application is characterized as a 
pen register request.251 
V.   The Development of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
In order to understand the applicability of the Fourth Amendment 
to the government’s applications seeking authorization of cell site 
simulators, one must understand the history of the Fourth Amendment. 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence developed from a fairly narrow 
property-centric interpretation to a more flexible standard based on 
reasonable expectations. This more flexible standard should be 
reassessed in order to ensure that cell phone users have privacy from 
governmental intrusions into their cell phones. 
A. Historically, the Fourth Amendment was Property-Centric 
To better understand the current state of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, it is important to understand a little about where we 
started. In light of disputes with the British authorities, the founding 
fathers sought to ensure that people in the newly formed country would 
be secure from discretionary governmental intrusions in their lives.252 
The Fourth Amendment provides that it is “[t]he right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”253 It further mandates that “no 
 
 249. Id. at 11–13. 
 250. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (In the Stored Communications Act, Congress authorized law 
enforcement officials to obtain telecommunications customer records, including “name; address; local 
and long distance telephone connection records, or records of session times and durations; length of 
service (including start date) and types of service utilized; telephone or instrument number or other 
subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily assigned network address; and means and 
source of payment for such service (including any credit card or bank account number).”); accord In re 
§ 2703(d) Order, 787 F. Supp. 2d 430, 436 (E.D. Va. 2011); see In re Application of the U.S. for an 
Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 157 F. Supp. 2d 286, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (a § 2703 order 
authorized law enforcement officials to obtain “the subscriber’s name, home address, telephone 
number, e-mail address and any other identifying information [the provider] may have, such as date of 
birth, social security number, driver’s license number and billing information”). For a court to issue an 
order pursuant to § 2703(d), the government must demonstrate “specific and articulable facts showing 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, 
or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2013) (emphasis added). 
 251. Letter from Martin Bland to Donal Brown, supra note 241, at 11–13. 
 252. Casey, supra note 77, at 983. 
 253. U.S. Const. amend IV. 
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Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”254 Consequently, the 
threshold matter in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence “is whether a 
specific action or intrusion by the government constitutes a ‘search’ 
within the meaning of the Amendment.”255 
Historically, the Fourth Amendment was viewed to safeguard 
citizens against search of their homes, persons, and papers based on a 
right of property. Many scholars have posited that Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence was based on a theory of trespass.256 One scholar further 
explained that this trespass theory is rooted in the landmark pre-
constitution decision of Entick v. Carrington.257 However, Orin Kerr 
recently asserted that he and others had it wrong in viewing Fourth 
Amendment theory as having its historical foundation in trespass.258 
In one of the first Supreme Court decisions to address the Fourth 
Amendment, the defendant challenged the use of his records, seized 
without a warrant, to convict him for failure to pay customs duties.259 In 
Boyd, the Court addressed the question of “compulsory production of a 
man’s private papers, to be used against him in a proceeding to forfeit his 
property for alleged fraud against the revenue laws . . . [and whether that 
constituted] an ‘unreasonable search and seizure’ within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.”260 In concluding that the trial court erred in 
requiring the production of the defendant’s papers, the Court looked to 
early colonial history as well as English history, including the decision in 
Entick, finding that the entering and searching of the home constituted a 
trespass.261 
 
 254. Id.; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 (addressing the issuance of warrants, including for the seizure of 
electronically stored information). 
 255. Casey, supra note 77, at 983. 
 256. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, The Privacy Privilege: Law Enforcement, Technology, and the 
Constitution, 7 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y 123, 150 (2002) (“When the Fourth Amendment was adopted, the 
protection against invasions of privacy lay in trespass law . . . .”); Jace C. Gatewood, Warrantless GPS 
Surveillance: Search and Seizure—Using the Right to Exclude to Address the Constitutionality of 
GPS Tracking Systems Under the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 303, 333–34 (2011); Lewis 
R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-first Century, 65 Ind. L.J. 549, 556 n.36 
(1990) (“Linking the fourth amendment to its historical context, the Supreme Court during the pre-
Katz era allowed the law of trespass to control the outcome whenever it was claimed that government 
had conducted a ‘search.’”); David E. Steinberg, The Uses and Misuses of Fourth Amendment 
History, 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 581, 583 (2008) (“Historical sources indicate that the Framers were 
focused on a single, narrow problem: physical trespasses into houses by government agents.”). 
 257. (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.); Katz, supra note 256, at 556 n.36. 
 258. Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 Sup. Ct. Rev. 67, 69 
(2012); see Fabio Arcila, Jr., GPS Tracking Out of Fourth Amendment Dead Ends: United States v. 
Jones and the Katz Conundrum, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 21–22 (2012) (“Katz famously moved search 
jurisprudence to a privacy model. It did so by rejecting the property-centric Fourth Amendment 
model that had previously controlled, and which the Court had applied in Olmstead v. United 
States.”). 
 259. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 618 (1886). 
 260. Id. at 622 (emphasis in original). 
 261. Id. at 625–28. 
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In Olmstead v. United States,262 the Supreme Court considered a 
challenge to information that federal agents obtained from wiretapping 
the telephones within the homes of targets of a criminal investigation. 
Chief Justice Howard Taft made clear that the wiretapping was “made 
without trespass upon any property of the defendants” because the line 
that was tapped was “made in the basement of the large office 
building.”263 Nonetheless, he stressed that “[t]he well-known historical 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment, directed against general warrants 
and writs of assistance, was to prevent the use of governmental force to 
search a man’s house, his person, his papers, and his effects, and to 
prevent their seizure against his will.”264 In many regards, the applied 
approach was a plain language interpretation of the amendment. Indeed, 
Chief Justice Taft distinguished Hester v. United States,265 in which he 
acknowledged that there was a trespass on defendant’s property, but 
ultimately “no search of person, house, papers, or effects.”266 In dissent, 
however, Justice Louis Brandeis famously cautioned that the Fourth 
Amendment protected citizens against “invasion of ‘the sanctities of a 
man’s home and the privacies of life.’”267 
In Goldman v. United States,268 the Supreme Court considered 
federal agents’ use of a detectaphone against a wall to listen and assist in 
the recording of defendants’ conversation within one defendant’s office 
on the other side of the wall. The Court specifically held “what was heard 
by the use of the detectaphone was not made illegal by trespass or 
unlawful entry.”269 Instead, the only trespass occurred when agents 
actually entered the defendant’s office to install another device that 
ultimately did not function properly and provided no information.270 As 
in Olmstead, the dissents argued for individual privacy interests. For 
example, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone and Justice Felix Frankfurter 
wrote simply:  
Had a majority of the Court been willing to overrule the Olmstead 
case, we should have been happy to join them. But as they have 
 
 262. 277 U.S. 438, 455 (1928). 
 263. Id. at 457 (emphasis added); see Henry F. Fradella, et al., Quantifying Katz: Empirically 
Measuring “Reasonable Expectations of Privacy” in the Fourth Amendment Context, 38 Am. J. Crim. L. 
289, 325 (2011) (“The majority rested its decision on the premise that since the wiretapping involved no 
physical trespass onto the defendants’ property, there had been no Fourth Amendment violation.”). 
 264. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 463. 
 265. 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (holding that defendant’s illicit whiskey discovered by revenue officers 
in an open field on the property of the defendant’s father’s did not violate the Fourth Amendment); 
see United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712–13 (1984) (“technical trespass” in applying the beeper was 
insufficient to establish a Fourth Amendment violation). 
 266. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465. 
 267. Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
 268. 316 U.S. 129 (1942). 
 269. Id. at 134. 
 270. Id. at 134–35. 
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declined to do so, and as we think this case is indistinguishable from 
Olmstead’s, we have no occasion to repeat here the dissenting views in 
that case with which we agree.271  
Similarly, Justice Frank Murphy dissented, noting an individual’s “right 
of personal privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”272 
B. In KATZ, the Supreme Court Established the Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy Analysis 
Regardless of whether one views the development of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence through the prism of property rights, a 
trespass theory, or a literalist construction, after Katz v. United States,273 
the paradigm shifted. In Katz, the Supreme Court held that a listening 
device that recorded the defendant’s conversation while he talked in a 
public telephone booth violated the Fourth Amendment. Justice Stewart 
Potter explained that Katz, by entering the telephone booth and closing 
the door before engaging in his telephone call, evidenced an attempt and 
a belief that his conversation would be private.274 Justice Potter then 
elaborated that “[t]o read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore 
the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private 
communication.”275 Finally, he determined that “[t]he Government’s 
activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s 
words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using 
the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”276 Interestingly, the phrase 
“reasonable expectation of privacy,” which has been the lasting impact of 
Katz, is not from Justice Stewart’s majority opinion, but instead from a 
concurring opinion by Justice Harlan.277 
This “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard was reiterated 
and adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio.278 In 
elaborating on this standard, the Court explained, in United States v. 
 
 271. Id. at 136 (Stone, C.J. & Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 272. Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 273. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 274. Id. at 352; see Owsley, supra note 15, at 10 (discussing Katz). But see Orin S. Kerr, The 
Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 
102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, 821 (2004) (the question of “[e]xactly why the user of the phone booth was 
constitutionally entitled to his privacy was left to the reader’s imagination”) (emphasis in original). 
 275. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. 
 276. Id. at 353. 
 277. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I join the opinion of the Court, which I read to hold 
only . . . that an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home, and unlike a field, a person 
has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy . . . .”) (citations omitted); see 
Casey, supra note 77, at 988 (discussing Justice Harlan’s concurrence). 
 278. 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (“We have recently held that ‘the Fourth Amendment protects people, 
not places’ . . . and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable ‘expectation of privacy.’”) 
(quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
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Jacobsen,279 that “[a] ‘search’ occurs when an expectation of privacy that 
society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.”280 In the post-
Katz world we are left to ponder what reasonable expectation of privacy, 
if any, cell phone users have as it relates to the government’s use of cell 
site simulators. 
Orin Kerr has posited that while “the phrase ‘reasonable 
expectation of privacy’ is notoriously murky, much of the Supreme 
Court’s case law on the reasonable expectation of privacy test can be 
understood as distinguishing between inside and outside surveillance.”281 
In an earlier article he echoed this theme: “Although the phrase 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ sounds mystical, in most (though not 
all) cases, an expectation of privacy becomes ‘reasonable’ only when it is 
backed by a right to exclude borrowed from real property law.”282 He 
distinguished between inside and outside by elaborating that 
governmental conduct breaches a reasonable expectation of privacy 
when the surveillance exposes private, enclosed spaces, such as homes, 
cars, or packages.283 On the other hand, Patricia Bellia has maintained:  
The main constitutional question is whether one retains a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in communications stored with a third party, 
such that acquisition of these communications constitutes a ‘search’ 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. I call into question the 
prevailing assumption that an expectation of privacy is lacking when a 
service provider holds communications on a user’s behalf.284 
In Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court considered whether there 
were any privacy rights in the information that a pen register captures 
from a landline telephone.285 The Court held that the use of a pen 
register to obtain the telephone numbers dialed was not a Fourth 
Amendment search because the telephone user had “no actual 
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed.”286 However, the 
Court’s decision is a very narrow one and addresses pen register 
technology from the 1960s. Most importantly, the pen register at issue 
simply recorded a list of telephone numbers that were dialed from a 
landline telephone.287 Indeed, the decision was issued a decade before 
 
 279. 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
 280. Id. at 113 (citations omitted); see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978) 
(“Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth 
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings 
that are recognized and permitted by society.”). 
 281. Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 311, 316 (2012). 
 282. Kerr, supra note 274, at 809–10. 
 283. Kerr, supra note 281, at 316–17. 
 284. Bellia, supra note 82, at 1382. 
 285. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 286. Id. at 745–46. 
 287. See Casey, supra note 77, at 993 (“The Court’s description of a 1971 pen register [in Smith] 
highlights the dramatic change in the capability of a 2007 pen register.”). 
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the cell phone became ubiquitous. The Smith Court did not address the 
vast amount of information that the government routinely seeks these 
days in pen register applications for cellular telephones, including the 
time, date, and duration of any cell phone call as well as the physical 
location from which the call was made.288 In other words, the analysis of 
Smith v. Maryland, predicated on the information obtained on a landline 
telephone, does not apply to the information that is obtainable through a 
pen register for a cell phone today.289 The typical consumer does not 
expect that all of this data is widely available to the government any time 
that it simply asks for it.290 The uproar and outrage over the breaches by 
the National Security Agency (“NSA”) further demonstrate that there is 
no reasonable expectation that this information is anything but private.291 
In Georgia v. Randolph,292 the Supreme Court addressed a Fourth 
Amendment challenge in which the defendant sought to suppress 
cocaine obtained during a search of his home that resulted in this 
conviction for possession of cocaine. Specifically, when police officers 
responded to a call about a domestic dispute at the residence, the 
defendant’s estranged wife indicated to them that her husband had 
narcotics in their home.293 Although the defendant expressly refused to 
consent to the search of his home when officers asked, they then 
obtained consent from his wife.294 In the majority opinion written by 
Justice David Souter, the Court held that the warrantless search was 
unreasonable in light of the defendant’s express refusal to consent to the 
search.295 
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, Chief 
Justice John Roberts took issue with the notion that defendant had a 
 
 288. 442 U.S. at 736 n.1; see Casey, supra note 77, at 992 (“Significantly, the device did not 
‘overhear’ oral communications, and was not capable of determining whether or not the call was 
completed.”). 
 289. See California v. Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (distinguishing Smith in part because “call 
logs typically contain more than just phone numbers”). 
 290. See Marc McAllister, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: The Misapplication of 
Analogical Reasoning, 36 S. Ill. U. L.J. 475, 522 (2012) (“[R]ulings associated with more traditional 
forms of surveillance do not always comport with society’s actual expectations of privacy and often fail 
to account for relevant differences between the analogized cases.”). 
 291. Scott Shane & Colin Moynihan, Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove, Eclipsing N.S.A.’s, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 2, 2013, at A1; John Shiffman & Kristina Cooke, Exclusive: U.S. Directs Agents to Cover 
up Program Used to Investigate Americans, Reuters (Aug. 5, 2013, 3:25 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/05/us-dea-sod-idUSBRE97409R20130805. 
 292. 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
 293. Id. at 107; see Jeremy A. Blumenthal et al., The Multiple Dimensions of Privacy: Testing Lay 
“Expectations of Privacy,” 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 331, 334 (2009). 
 294. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 107. 
 295. Id. at 122–23 (“This case invites a straightforward application of the rule that a physically 
present inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police search is dispositive as to him, regardless of 
the consent of a fellow occupant. Scott Randolph’s refusal is clear, and nothing in the record justifies 
the search on grounds independent of Janet Randolph’s consent.”). 
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reasonable expectation of privacy in his home once he shared that home 
with another person, in this case his wife.296 Chief Justice Roberts 
continued by explaining that there are a large number of situations that 
might lead to various and different social expectations.297 Ultimately, he 
asserted that custom and “widely shared social expectation” were not a 
basis for evaluating a search pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.298 
Chief Justice Roberts’ visceral reaction to social expectation in 
Georgia v. Randolph is interesting when compared to his response to the 
Government’s oral argument in United States v. Jones. In Jones, the 
Court dealt with whether the government could place a GPS tracking 
device on the vehicle of a subject of a criminal investigation without a 
warrant. During oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts had this exchange 
with the Deputy Solicitor General: 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You think there would also not be a 
search if you put a GPS device on all of our cars, monitored our 
movements for a month? You think you’re entitled to do that under 
your theory? 
MR. DREEBEN: The Justices of this Court? 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes. 
(Laughter.) 
MR. DREEBEN: Under our theory and under this Court’s cases, the 
Justices of this Court when driving on public roadways have no greater 
expectation of — 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So, your answer is yes, you could 
tomorrow decide that you put a GPS device on every one of our cars, 
follow us for a month; no problem under the Constitution? 
MR. DREEBEN: Well, equally, Mr. Chief Justice, if the FBI wanted 
to, it could put a team of surveillance agents around the clock on any 
individual and follow that individual’s movements as they went around 
on the public streets.299 
Put simply, Chief Justice Roberts appeared to address the 
reasonable expectations of privacy as it personally relates to him and the 
other members of the Court. Roberts was seemingly concerned about the 
real possibility that someone could legally engage in this type of 
 
 296. Id. at 128 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The correct approach to the question presented is clearly 
mapped out in our precedents: The Fourth Amendment protects privacy. If an individual shares 
information, papers, or places with another, he assumes the risk that the other person will in turn share 
access to that information or those papers or places with the government.”) (emphasis in original). 
 297. Id. at 129–30 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 298. Id. at 131 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see Fradella et al., supra note 263, at 293 (“[J]udges 
make no attempt to discern actual societal opinions when adjudicating Fourth Amendment 
disputes.”); Blumenthal et al., supra note 293, at 332 (judges often “made explicit psychological 
assumptions about perceptions and expectations of privacy, assumptions that are not necessarily 
supported by empirical findings”). 
 299. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–10, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-
1259); see Arcila, supra note 258, at 40 (discussing this exchange). 
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surveillance of his vehicle without judicial authorization.300 While the 
majority decision, which he joined, focused on a Fourth Amendment 
violation based on a trespass theory, he implied that the Supreme Court 
Justices (and others) had an expectation of some privacy.301 The reason 
for this expectation could arguably be based on the personal nature of 
one’s vehicle and daily travels. Still, he argued there was no expectation 
of privacy if law enforcement officials arrived at his residence and sought 
to search his home over his objections if his wife gave them express 
authority.302 Possibly, he was more certain that he and his wife are of one 
mind regarding such a potential intrusion than the possibility that a 
tracking device could be placed on his vehicle. 
In Jones, Justice Sonia Sotomayor discussed both Smith and Miller 
in arguing that the third-party doctrine needs to be reconsidered: “it may 
be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to 
third parties.”303 She continued by asserting that the approach 
established in Miller and Smith “is ill suited to the digital age, in which 
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third 
parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks” including revealing 
information based on their cell phone usage.304 In criticizing Justice’s 
Scalia’s opinion in Jones, Justice Samuel Alito noted that the issue was 
not the physical trespass, but the lengthy and intrusive nature of the 
electronic surveillance.305 He continued by positing that the old method 
of Fourth Amendment analysis may be inapplicable to the new issues 
raised by electronic surveillance.306 Similarly, the Court in Kyllo v. 
United States307 cautioned that “[w]hile the technology used in the 
present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of 
more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.”308 
Since the Supreme Court decided Jones, one federal appellate court 
has addressed the issue of whether the use of warrantless cell site 
location information violates the Fourth Amendment. The Eleventh 
Circuit concluded that “it cannot be denied that the Fourth Amendment 
 
 300. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259). 
 301. A significant majority of individuals surveyed have a reasonable expectation of privacy from 
electronic tracking of one’s vehicle. See Fradella et al., supra note 263, at 325. 
 302. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120. 
 303. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
742 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)). 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). 
 306. Id. at 962. 
 307. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 308. Id. at 36. But see City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010) (“The judiciary risks error 
by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role 
in society has become clear.”); see also Owsley, supra note 15, at 11. 
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protection against unreasonable searches and seizures shields the people 
from the warrantless interception of electronic data or sound waves 
carrying communications.”309 The court continued with an analysis of the 
three decisions in Jones and noted that the Katz privacy test is still 
applicable.310 Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit held “that cell site location 
information is within the subscriber’s reasonable expectation of privacy” 
and that “obtaining of that data without a warrant is a Fourth 
Amendment violation.”311 
Most recently, in Riley v. California, the Supreme Court addressed 
whether evidence obtained by police from a defendant’s cell phone 
during a warrantless search subsequent arrest violated the Fourth 
Amendment.312 In the first of the consolidated cases, David Riley was 
stopped by police officers for a routine traffic stop and then subsequently 
arrested after his car was impounded and a search revealed firearms.313 
During his arrest, the officers seized his smart phone from his pants 
pocket and searched it, thereafter concluding that he was a member of a 
street gang.314 The prosecution charged him with a number of offenses, 
some of which carried sentencing enhancements based on his gang 
affiliation.315 Riley challenged the denial of his motion to suppress this 
information.316 
In the second case, Brima Wurie was arrested for selling drugs. 
While under arrest, police officers noticed that his flip phone was 
receiving several calls from a number labeled “my house.”317 After 
searching this cell phone’s call log, the officers traced the number to his 
apartment.318 The police then went to Wurie’s residence and confirmed 
that it was in fact his home, in part because the woman pictured in his flip 
phone was found at the apartment.319 A subsequent search of the 
apartment revealed drugs and firearms, resulting in multiple federal 
charges against him.320 The district court denied his motion to suppress, 
but the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and vacated 
Wurie’s three convictions.321 
 
 309. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1213 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 310. Id. at 1215. 
 311. Id. at 1217. 
 312. California v. Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).  
 313. Id. at 2480. 
 314. Id.  
 315. Id. at 2481. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id.  
 318. Id. 
 319. Id.  
 320. Id.  
 321. Id. at 2482. 
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In analyzing these two cases, the Court first discussed the history of 
Fourth Amendment in the context of searches incident to arrest, and 
ultimately held “that officers must generally secure a warrant before 
conducting such a search” of a cell phone.322 The Court continued its 
analysis by noting that “[d]igital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself 
be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the 
arrestee’s escape. Once an officer has secured a phone and eliminated 
any potential physical threats, however, data on the phone can endanger 
no one.”323  
The Court focused next on privacy concerns raised by cell phones, 
explaining that these devices were essentially small computers that 
stored immense amounts of data and information.324 The opinion focused 
on several reasons that cell phones implicate significant privacy concerns: 
First, a cell phone collects in one place many types of information—an 
address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video—that reveal 
much more in combination than any isolated record. Second, a cell 
phone’s capacity allows even just one type of information to convey far 
more than previously possible. The sum of an individual’s private life 
can be reconstructed through a thousand photographs labeled with 
dates, locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be said of a 
photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet. Third, the data 
on a phone can date back to the purchase of the phone, or even earlier. 
A person might carry in his pocket a slip of paper reminding him to call 
Mr. Jones; he would not carry a record of all of his communications 
with Mr. Jones for the past several months, as would routinely be kept 
on a phone.325 
Finally, the Court emphasized the pervasiveness of cell phones and the 
fact that people carry them, with all their sensitive information, with 
them all of the time.326 Thus, all nine justices held that police must get a 
search warrant prior to searching a seized cell phone.327 
C. People Have a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Their Cell 
Phones, Including the Numbers They Dial 
While Katz established the principle of an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy, Smith v. Maryland and United States v. Miller328 
are the Supreme Court decisions that are relied upon for the third-party 
doctrine, which in some ways undercuts Katz. In Miller, federal agents 
served grand jury subpoenas issued by the United States Attorney on the 
 
 322. Id. at 2485. 
 323. Id.  
 324. Id. at 2489. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. at 2490. 
 327. Id. at 2495. 
 328. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
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defendant’s banks seeking records to support a criminal investigation.329 
In a motion to suppress, the defendant challenged the subpoenas because 
they were not issued by a court.330 Because the defendant had provided 
his information to the bank in the regular course of his various banking 
transactions, the Supreme Court determined that he no longer had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.331 Consequently, the Court held “that 
there was no intrusion into any area in which respondent had a protected 
Fourth Amendment interest and that the District Court therefore 
correctly denied respondent’s motion to suppress.”332 Of course, in this 
day and age of online banking, people may have a different expectation 
of privacy than they used to. 
Generally, there is not much in the way of empirical research 
regarding people’s reasonable expectations of privacy.333 Moreover, 
there does not appear to be any research questioning people’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy regarding the telephone numbers that they dial 
with their cell phones. The limited data reflects that individuals, when 
surveyed, “overwhelmingly expressed agreement with precedent limiting 
invasions of communications privacy.”334 In one survey, 63.1% of 
participants agreed with the decision in Katz requiring a warrant to 
record a phone conversation.335 That rate went up to 91.7% if the phone in 
question was the participant’s cell phone.336 
Some scholars have asserted that the Supreme Court’s 
determinations of what constitutes “reasonable expectations of privacy” 
“are often not in tune with commonly held values.”337 The limited 
existing quantitative research supports this claim. For example, 85.5% of 
respondents in one survey disagreed with United States v. Knott,338 in 
which the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless installation of a 
tracking device on a vehicle.339 Similarly, in a poll of Californians, 73 
percent “favor a law that required the police to convince a judge that a 
crime has been committed before obtaining location information from 
 
 329. Id. at 437. 
 330. Id. at 438–39. 
 331. Id. at 445. 
 332. Id. at 440. 
 333. See Blumenthal et al., supra note 293, at 334 (“Little relevant empirical research has been 
conducted on perceptions of privacy . . . .”); Fradella et al., supra note 263, at 338 (“Much more 
research also needs to be conducted to assess the impact of changes in U.S. surveillance and search 
and seizure jurisprudence on the privacy rights of citizens.”). 
 334. Fradella et al., supra note 263, at 338. 
 335. Id. at 366. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Rating the Intrusiveness of Law Enforcement 
Searches and Seizures, 17 Law & Hum. Behav. 183, 198 (1993). 
 338. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 339. Fradella et al., supra note 263, at 366–67. 
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the cell phone company.”340 Moreover, in a question based on United 
States v. Miller, 85.4% of those surveyed disagreed with the Court’s ruling 
that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s bank 
records.341 These results demonstrate a significant disconnect between 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of what constitutes a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in various contexts and individual’s actual 
expectations. 
Specifically, several state courts have rejected the applicability of 
Miller pursuant to state constitutions.342 Similarly, various state courts 
have rejected the reasoning and ruling in Smith v. Maryland.343 In light of 
numerous state court decisions addressing pen registers, the 
government’s use of a pen register to obtain authorization for cell site 
simulators is troubling from the perspective of a reasonable expectation 
of privacy standard. A number of state courts have concluded, based on 
state constitutions and statutes, that their citizens have such a privacy 
expectation and that probable cause and a warrant are necessary for a 
pen register.344 Interestingly, these various state court decisions regarding 
 
 340. Jennifer King & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Research Report: A Supermajority of 
Californians Supports Limits on Law Enforcement Access to Cell Location Information 8 
(2008), available at www.ftc.gov/os/comments/mobilevoice/534331-00005.pdf. 
 341. Fradella et al., supra note 263, at 366. 
 342. See, e.g., State v. McAllister, 875 A.2d 866, 875 (N.J. 2005); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 
418 (Utah 1991) (the Utah Constitution provides individuals “a right to be secure against 
unreasonable searches and seizures of their bank statements”); Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel 
Wagering, Dep’t of Bus. Regulation, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985) (“[T]he law in the state of Florida 
recognizes an individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy in financial institution records.”); Charnes 
v. DiGiacomo, 612 P.2d 1117, 1121–22, 1124 (Colo. 1980) (en banc) (distinguishing Miller and holding 
that “[a]n individual has an expectation of privacy in records of his financial transactions held by a 
bank in Colorado.”);; People v. Jackson, 452 N.E.2d 85, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (“[W]e reject the idea 
set out in Miller that a citizen waives any legitimate expectation in her financial records when she 
resorts to the banking system.”).  
 343. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Melilli, 555 A.2d 1254, 1258 (Pa. 1989) (expressly rejecting Smith 
v. Maryland); Richardson v. State, 865 S.W.2d 944, 951–52, 952 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (rejecting 
Smith v. Maryland). 
 344. See, e.g., People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 144 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (holding that the 
Colorado Constitution provides a telephone subscriber with a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
numbers dialed such that they cannot be obtained without a search warrant based on probable cause); 
Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 151–52 (Fla. 1989) (“Because the pen register intrudes upon 
fundamental privacy interests [based on the Florida Constitution], the state has the burden of 
demonstrating both that the intrusion is justified by a compelling state interest and that the state has 
used the least intrusive means in accomplishing its goal.”); State v. Rothman, 779 P.2d 1, 7 (Haw. 1989) 
(“[P]ersons using telephones in the State of Hawaii have a reasonable expectation of privacy, with 
respect to the telephone numbers they call on their private lines . . . .”); State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d 
1162, 1165–67 (Idaho 1988) (a pen register was a search pursuant to the Idaho Constitution and 
required a warrant); State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 956–57 (N.J. 1982) (the New Jersey Constitution 
affords individuals the right to privacy in their toll billing records and, by implication, pen register 
records); Commonwealth v. Beauford, 475 A.2d 783, 791 (Pa. Super. 1984) (holding that individuals 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers one dials and the Pennsylvania 
Constitution protects individuals against the installation of pen registers without a demonstration of 
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privacy rights, pen registers, and one’s reasonable expectations of privacy 
were all decided in the 1980s, before the cell phone became ubiquitous in 
American life. These expectations have not disappeared as pen registers 
have grown more sophisticated and most people rely exclusively on their 
cell phones to communicate with others. For example, in State v. 
Branigh,345 the Court of Appeals of Idaho concluded that the defendant 
“had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone log records 
that the State obtained from Sprint and that the State’s acquisition of 
those logs was subject to the restraints of [the Idaho Constitution].”346 
Moreover, this protection extends to the records documenting the dates, 
times, and recipients of text messages.347 
These state court decisions just start to scratch the surface of various 
jurisdictions’ notions of reasonable expectations of privacy regarding these 
matters. It stands to reason that if various people around the country 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in preventing law enforcement 
officials from obtaining their telephone call records based on standard 
pen register requests, then these same people would have similar privacy 
expectations in any pen register request for a cell site simulator. 
That so many state courts and legislatures conclude that there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding pen registers further supports 
the position that a cell site simulator would have a similar, if not stronger, 
expectation of privacy. Coupled with the fact that the pen register at issue 
in Smith v. Maryland was a significantly less technologically advanced 
version of the pen registers typically sought today, there is a good 
argument that the day for reassessment of the continued viability of the 
decision is coming. One need look no further than the recent issues 
involving massive electronic searches of American citizens by the NSA to 
know that many people believe this day has arrived. Indeed, while a pen 
register in the Smith v. Maryland era obtained the only outgoing 
telephone numbers called, a pen register for a cell phone provides much 
more information today, including the telephone numbers dialed for text 
messages and phone calls; the date, time, duration of such phone calls 
and text messages; and the location of the cell phone.348 
 
probable cause); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 813 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (holding that the 
Washington Constitution barred the use of a pen register without a search warrant); see also 
Richardson v. State, 865 S.W.2d 944, 953 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc) (holding that a pen register 
may be a search pursuant to the Texas Constitution). 
 345. 313 P.3d 732 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013). 
 346. Id. at 738 (discussing Thompson, 760 P.2d at 1165). 
 347. Id. 
 348. Kelly, supra note 3. 
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 Conclusion 
The purpose of this Article is not to reject the use of cell site 
simulators. Indeed, it is clear that these devices can be effective tools in 
law enforcement arsenals. For example, the use of a cell site simulator 
near a prison facility can assist in locating a cell phone used by inmates in 
furtherance of criminal activity. 
Nonetheless, there are significant concerns for the privacy rights and 
interests of third parties. Regarding the applications for the use of cell 
site simulators, law enforcement officials should minimize the impact that 
cell site simulators have on such third parties, including by developing a 
protocol that explains attempts to minimize the invasion of privacy.349 
It is clear that an application for a cell site simulator seeks 
authorization for a device unanticipated by Congress in the pen register 
statute. “If courts find that the new methods do not fit into the statutory 
definition, they may follow the lead of those courts who have regarded 
the new practices as completely unregulated.”350 For law enforcement 
officials to obtain judicial approval for the use of cell site simulators, they 
should have to seek authorization pursuant to a search warrant consistent 
with Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Alternatively, 
they can persuade Congress to amend the pen register statute to 
authorize cell site simulators. 
Scholars have long called for Congress to amend the ECPA in order to 
update it to address the myriad of technological developments in 
surveillance since 1986.351 As Susan Freiwald has asserted, “[t]he ECPA, 
because it permits a substantial amount of surveillance to proceed 
without the requirement of a warrant, let alone the heightened 
procedural safeguards that apply to wiretapping, should have been quite 
vulnerable to constitutional challenges.”352 Congressional reticence to 
amend may require that the courts handle the matter of safeguarding the 
public: “the Supreme Court has taken a hands-off approach to technological 
development, refusing to recognize Fourth Amendment privacy barriers to 
its use. However, the Court has sometimes been willing to intervene even 
 
 349. See Owsley, supra note 15, at 46. 
 350. Freiwald, supra note 93, at 999–1000; see Bellia, supra note 82, at 1382 (“Because application of 
the Fourth Amendment is in doubt, the statutory rules for acquisition of communications are all the more 
important. Those provisions, however, reflect significant gaps and ambiguities.”). 
 351. See Bellia, supra note 82, at 1458 (noting that Congress “could not have anticipated that 
technological developments would place so many electronic communications in the hands of third 
parties” when the ECPA was enacted); Orin Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act 
and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1208 (2004) (addressing areas of 
potential reform); Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A 
Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 1557, 1559 
(2004) (explaining that the statute “has failed to keep pace with changes in and on the Internet and 
therefore no longer provides appropriate privacy protections”). 
 352. Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 3, 4 (2007). 
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at the risk of dramatically changing Fourth Amendment law.”353 Because 
the ECPA does not provide a suppression remedy, individuals cannot 
assert claims for violations of the statute themselves, and the courts 
become all the more important.354 Such courts are those presided over by 
magistrate judges who handle the vast majority of these types of requests 
at their initial stages. Only if these judges safeguard the Constitution and 
bring a voice to the countless citizens across the country can the 
reasonable expectations of so many be protected. 
 
 353. Arcila, supra note 258, at 49. 
 354. See 18 U.S.C. § 2708 (2013); see also Freiwald, supra note 352, at 4. 
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